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. . . . .
Chapter 1: Intrafamily Bargaining and Love
Popular culture and common wisdom testify that the way partners in a
relationship feel for one another very much depends on how they treat each
other. This paper posits the hypothesis that altruism or love in a relationship
is endogenous to the actions of the partners and studies how this influences
allocations and efficiency in a bargaining model of household decision-making.
The main results are that agents treat their partner in a kinder way than without
endogenously evolving love, this leads to more equitable allocations in household
decision making and greater intertemporal efficiency. There are two mechanisms
at work: agents treat their partner nicely to avoid retribution by a less loving
partner in the future; and they treat the partner nicely so that the kind reciprocal
behavior raises their own love towards the partner, which lets them enjoy higher
utility.
As to love, two interpretations emerge: love is a commitment device by which
couples can implement Pareto superior allocations; and love is an investment
good in the sense that costly nice behavior towards the partner today may
ensure higher levels of trust and efficiency in the future.
This chapter has been published as Si [2014].
. . . . .
Chapter 2: Perception of Technology and Technological Progress
under Extractive Institutions
This paper explores the impact of different perceptions of the nature of tech-
nology - whether it may grow in an arithmetic or geometric fashion - on the
choices of an elite that lives on extracting resources from the productive pop-
ulace. We show that slow potential growth destroys the credibility of inclusive
institutions that the elite may consider in order to foster growth whereas these
can and will be implemented if populace and elite believe in fast growth.
Belief in the potential of technological growth leads to growth-friendly policies
under both extractive and inclusive institutions and, as history progresses, the
true nature of technology reveals itself and this belief spreads.
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. . . . .
Chapter 3: A critical literature review of the Property Rights
Theory of the Firm and the communication of Unprotected Infor-
mation Assets
This paper reviews the literature centred on the question of what kind of
settings facilitate the transmission of unverifiable pieces of information that re-
side with an agent whose incentives are not well aligned with an agent for whom
this piece of information is useful. The question is framed within the Property
Rights Theory of the Firm and its answers make extensive use of the mod-
elling device of Cheap Talk. The main findings are that communication leads
to costly distortions and the efforts to decrease bias and information loss may
trigger major revisions to the structure of incentive systems and the allocation of
decision-rights. The paper argues that the literature has so far failed to properly




Intrafamily Bargaining and Love
1.1 Introduction
Any cursory look at popular culture, from any age, suggests that love takes
center stage at least at some point in the life of most people.
And yet the love between two people has received scant interest from economists.
When it appears, it is usually either invoked to justify altruistic feelings within a
household as in Nordblom [2004] or to describe the emotional benefit two agents
gain when matched in a marriage as in Konrad and Lommerud [2008]; while in
Hess [2004] love is a public good in marriage that follows an exogenous process.
This paper takes a different view: while initial love or suitability upon the
first meeting may be viewed as exogenous, love/altruism in a relationship is re-
sponsive to what is happening in that relationship. In particular, the way one
partner treats the other will influence the love his partner feels for him and so
love co-evolves with the relationship, strengthening or deteriorating depending
on the choices of the partners. In more economic terms, love is endogenous to
the decision-making within the family.
The most closely related paper is Browning [2009] who explores how the fear of
a drop in affection due to a ‘betrayal’ can help couples overcome commitment
issues in their decision-making. Whereas his analysis focuses on the single de-
cision of betrayal or no betrayal and a loss of love, I study the evolution of love
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as the spouses repeatedly interact. In so doing this paper can also be likened to
Liu [2007] who looks for the optimal investment into the quality of a marriage
in a dynamic setting - ignoring, however, issues of love and strategic interaction.
Following the received literature on household decision-making, I model the
family as a couple who simultaneously and repeatedly decide how much of their
time each should allocate to privately enjoyed leisure and to household public
good production which, as indicated by the wording, benefits both members of
the couple. As the allocation of work is endogenously determined, this setup can
be interpreted as a stylized model of bargaining. The love an agent feels towards
his partner is then assumed to be responsive to the time allocation decision of
the partner.
From the Markov-perfect equilibrium I derive the steady states dependent on the
parameter values and the initial state. It is then argued that agents, anticipating
the endogenous change in their own and their partner’s incentives due to changes
in the levels of love, invest into the relationship by working more than would
be optimal considering the single period setup. They may share the burden
of lifting their partnership to the full love state by playing strategies that are
complementary in investment.
In cases in which agents are sufficiently patient and productive in household
public good production as well as face sufficiently low risks of divorce, breakup
or death, the initial levels of love therefore play no role in the steady state. For
the less patient, less productive, and at higher risk, which one may perhaps
interpret at less suited for one another, this does not hold and initial levels of
love determine the utility levels of the steady state.
1.2 Related Literature
In exploring a way of modeling the evolution of love in a relationship, the present
paper builds on and contributes to the received literature on household decision-
making.
In what McElroy and Horney [1981] called the ”neoclassical” approach,
economists have for a long time treated the decision-making within the household
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as resulting in the household behaving towards the outside world like a single
individual. This was given a formal shape by Samuelson [1956] who looked for
conditions under which the household acts like an individual; in doing so he
posits a social welfare function which the household members agree to maxi-
mize, together with lump-sum transfers between the members1.
This unitary view of the household can also be found in parts of the work of
Gary S. Becker, most explicitly in the so-called Rotten Kid Theorem, proposed
in Becker [1974a] and elaborated in amongst others Bergstrom [1989], Bruce and
Waldman [1990] and Johnson [1990].
Becker, however, was also among the first to explore non-unitary models of
decision-making in households, foremost in his seminal paper on time allocation,
Becker [1965], but also on his work on marriage, e.g. Becker [1973]2.
Independently from each other, Manser and Brown [1980] and McElroy and
Horney [1981] developed models of household decision-making based on the
conception that households can be understood as two individuals bargaining
over the distribution of the gains realized by entering the household (or mar-
riage). Manser and Brown [1980] explore different bargaining setups such as
Nash bargaining, bargaining according to Kalai and Smorodinsky [1975] as well
as dictatorial bargaining while the analysis of McElroy and Horney [1981] focus
on Nash bargaining and work out in detail the differences in implications for
observable demand between Nash bargaining households and single households.
The underlying view of the household is one in which individuals may have
different preferences, yet come together because there are gains from close co-
operation. These may be due to differences in their productivity in household
production processes3 or to the benefits of joint consumption like household
public goods4.
The ensuing literature has given attention to non-cooperative aspects of
household decision-making. Lundberg and Pollak [1993] define the threat point
of the bargaining not by the utility in the single state but by the utility in a
1As noted by Samuelson [1956], this model does not attempt explain how decision-making
within households actually takes place.
2For a discussion see Grossbard [2010].
3See e.g. Becker [1965, 1981] and Pollak and Wachter [1975]. A recent addition to this line
of enquiry is given by Brown and Zhang [2012]
4See the discussion in Manser and Brown [1980] p. 34.
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non-cooperative Cournot equilibrium in which the agents do not end the mar-
riage but make only voluntary contributions to household public goods. Other
papers that apply solution concepts of non-cooperative game theory to house-
hold decision-making problems include Bragstad [1991], Lundberg and Pollak
[1996] and Konrad and Lommerud [1995, 2000].
The literature has also been exploring the implications of explicitly modeling
household behavior in a dynamic way; this includes for instance Ligon [2011],
Konrad and Lommerud [2000], Lundberg and Pollak [2003] and Basu [2006].
Lundberg and Pollak [2003] exemplify the main point of this part of the litera-
ture; they consider a dual-earner couple deciding on the location at which to live
and work which is modeled as a two stage game. If location choice influences the
bargaining power of the household members in the second stage and this is fore-
seen in the first stage, then even Pareto optimal bargaining in the second period
is not sufficient to ensure Pareto efficiency of the full game. This result is repli-
cated in different guises across the literature: Endogenous bargaining power and
limited commitment power induce inefficiency in the decision-making process of
households.
Recently, Browning [2009] demonstrated that introducing love and a feel-
ing of betrayal into the location problem discussed above may overcome this
inefficiency. In particular, the advantaged spouse can choose not to exercise
her increased bargaining power and she may be able to commit to this because
reneging on the promise would cause the Beckerian caring, or love, of the partner
to drop. This is described as the effect of betrayal and works as a commitment
device because it is automatic and thus immune to renegotiation.
Approaching the problem from another angle, Dufwenberg [2002], who draws
on insights of psychological games5, shows that with beliefs based on forward
induction an equivalent commitment device can be provided by a feeling of guilt.
Yet another angle is chosen by Cigno [2012] who shows that the institutional
setup of the marriage contract can ameliorate dynamic efficiency by handing
the partner whose future bargaining position is weakened the credible threat of
5The classic reference for psychological games is Geanakoplos et al. [1989]. Their approach
has been adapted to fairness (including reciprocity) in normal form games by Rabin [1993];
extensions to sequential games can be found e.g. in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [2004]
and Falk and Fischbacher [2006]. For a recent exposition of altruistic feelings dependent on
intentions see Cox et al. [2007].
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divorce.
The model developed in the next section builds on this last strand of litera-
ture: the evolution of love within marriage can be interpreted as the endogenous
evolution of the bargaining power in the decision-making process of the house-
hold. It will be shown that it can also be interpreted as a commitment device
in a similar fashion to Browning [2009].
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Utility Function
Let the household consist of two agents, A and B, who interact repeatedly.
Agents consume leisure and a household specific public good which they pro-
duce using a constant returns to scale production function; let the level of the
public good in period t be denoted Gt = β(wA,t +wB,t) where wi,t is the amount
of work that agent i puts into the production of the public good and β ∈ (2
3
, 1) is
the productivity of agents in this activity. Normalizing disposable time per pe-
riod to 1 lets the decision variable be wi,t ∈ [0, 1] and yields leisure of 1−wi,t ≥ 0.
To simplify the analysis I restrict the choice of the agents to the discrete set of
wi,t ∈ {0, 1}.
For his instantaneous self-regarding utility, agent i values these two goods ac-
cording to (where j 6= i):
ui,t = u(Gt, 1− wi,t) = β(wi,t + wj,t) + (1− wi,t). (1.1)
He also cares about the other agent in the household and so his total instanta-
neous utility is given by:
vi,t = ui,t + αi,tuj,t, (1.2)
where αi,t measures his ‘love’ towards the other agent; note that this love is
potentially time-varying. These are preferences that Becker [1974b] called ”car-
ing”. αi,t must be an element of {0, 1}. Letting αi,t only take these two particular
values can be motivated by interpreting the real world equivalent of a period in
the model to be measured in weeks or months rather than hours or days. In
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each period, love is thus determined by the experience one has accumulated over
a longer stretch of time and it is this love that influences the decision-making
for the next period. Love in this model defines a state of being and this one can
argue is mostly polarised in either a loving or a not loving state.
It is standard in the literature to let these caring preferences be targeted
at the instantaneous self-regarding utility of the partner rather than his total
instantaneous utility or total expected utility and this is very fitting in the
circumstances of this model. The setting is not one of Pareto efficient axiomatic
bargaining but of non-cooperative games and so it is natural to assume that
the caring towards the partner is limited to what one can directly observe or
guess with high confidence, namely instantaneous self-regarding utility; loving
the other love of the other person appears far-fetched.
Agents are assumed to be expected utility maximizers and thus agent i in










(1 + αi,τ )Gτ + (1-wi,τ ) + αi,τ (1-wj,τ )
]
.
As fixed parameters we have the time discount factor 0 < δ < 1 and the pro-
ductivity of agents in household good production β. Note that the discount
factor can be interpreted as a reduced form in the sense that it collapses dis-
count factors for time preference and risk, δ = δtime · δrisk, where risk includes
mortality and breakup or divorce. As a shorthand, I shall refer to the collapsed
δ as ‘patience’.
1.3.2 Stage Game
If αA,t = αB,t = 0 and β is in (
1
2
, 1) the stage game is a classical prisoners’
dilemma: β > 1
2
means that the Pareto efficient outcome is for both agents to
put all their time into household public good production while β < 1 ensures that
implementing this outcome is not the preferred strategy under any circumstance.
Non-zero levels of love change this: for an agent in love, putting all his effort
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into household public good production is the dominant strategy and so the
prisoners’ dilemma disappears. Less obviously, the lower bound on β for which





can be verified by an inspection of the social welfare function Wt = Ut,i + Ut,j
which after rearranging can be written as:
Wt = (2+αt,i+αt,j)β(wt,i+wt,j)+(1+αt,j)(1−wt,i)+(1+αt,i)(1−wt,j). (1.4)
Clearly, the work leisure trade-off, from a social planner’s point of view, is sum-
marized by the marginal payoff from work in household public good production,
(2 + αt,i + αt,j)β, and the marginal payoff from leisure, 1 + αt,j and 1 + αt,i,
respectively.
As long as αt,i = αt,j = αt we have that (2 + αt + αt)β > 1 + αt (so that
wt,i = wt,j = 1 is socially optimal) if β >
1
2
and the reverse if β < 1
2
; this follows
from the public good nature of the household good and the fact that we are
looking at a household of two agents.
When the two levels of love are not the same αt,i 6= αt,j then things are compli-
cated by the fact that the agent with the higher level of love, say i, internalizes
the self-regarding well-being of his partner more than vice-versa. This inter-
nalization gives the object of affection the characteristic of a public good and
therefore the leisure consumed by better loved agent receives greater weight in
the social welfare function: the marginal payoff of j’s leisure increases propor-
tionally with αi,t while the payoff of his work increases only proportionally to
αi,tβ. In this case, β >
1
2
is not a sufficient condition for wt,i = wt,j = 1 being
socially optimal.
If β > 2
3
, however, the effect of differential love is dominated by the effect of the












⇒ (2 + αt,i + αt,j)β > 1 + max(αt,i, αt,j). (1.5)
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1.3.3 Game Structure
In each period or round of the game, agents independently and simultaneously
decide on how much to work in household public good production. Then their
levels of love are recalculated and the next round begins. Agents play an infinite
number of rounds of this game. It should be noted that this infinite discounted
game is equivalent to one with random termination6.
Love of agent i towards the partner in period t is captured by αi,t. Love is
assumed to vary with the amount of work that the partner puts into household
public good production: if j works a lot in household public good production,
which benefits agent i, then i’s love for j increases/stays high. To simplify the
notation, I set αi,t = wj,t−1 and vice versa for αi,t
7.
In order to ease the language I shall refer to an agent’s love being ‘high’
when his α is one and shall say he ‘works’ if his w is one and that he does not
otherwise.
1.3.4 Equilibrium
The solution concept is Markov-perfect equilibrium so that the state-dependent
strategies of the agents must constitute a Nash equilibrium in every state. State-
dependency implies that the history of the play of the two players enters their
strategy only implicitly through the levels of love of the two agents.
There are then four possible states of love in the relationship of the two agents:
writing (αi,t, αj,t) we can have (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1) or (1, 1).
We can construct a table of all possible strategies of agent i, this is done
in Table 1 where for each of the 16 possible strategies I list the value of wi
depending on the four states.
6If agents are mortal and do not know the exact time of their death then their expectation
can be modeled as an infinite life with a certain probability of death every period.
7In the evolution of love, I am abstracting from factors other the partner’s treatment.
Other factors would for instance include the presence or absence of children as studied in
Grossbard and Mukhopadhyay [2012].
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Table 1
strategies in wi (numbered from 1 to 16)
state (αi,t, αj,t) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
I (0, 0) 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
II (1, 0) 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
III (0, 1) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
IV (1, 1) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
not dominated 1 1 1 1
The last line of Table 1 marks the strategies that are not dominated by some
other strategy. The logic behind is the following: in states II and IV , when
agent i’s love is high, he is intrinsically motivated to work in the sense that
it maximizes his period utility; working also raises the partner’s love which is
beneficial to i by potentially inducing j to work more than otherwise. Therefore
in these states agent i will always choose to work.
The four remaining strategies can be characterized as follows:
• strategy number 10, renamed to S
This is the “selfish strategy”. The agent acts as if he was maximizing his
current period utility.
• strategy number 13, renamed to O
This is the “optimistic initial investment strategy”. When there is no love
in the relationship, the agent invests by working.
• strategy number 15, renamed to F
This is the “keep the flame alive strategy”. The agent keeps the partner
in a loving state.
• strategy number 16, renamed to W
This is the “unconditional work strategy”. The agent works under any
circumstance.
The same exercise can be conducted for agent j reaching the mirror outcome.
For a pair of strategies to form a Nash equilibrium they must be best re-
sponses (BRs) to one another. It will be instructive to calculate the best re-
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sponse function of one agent to any of the four strategies that his partner may
follow.
Suppose first that agent j is playing strategy S (defined analogously to how
we defined S for agent i). When computing the best response for i we now
need only consider states O and III as in the other two states all strategies
imply the same course of action and thus lead to the same utility. Consider the
possibilities in turn.
• state I, i plays S:
Agents will play wi,t = wj,t = 0 and therefore perpetuate state I. Total
expected utility of i is therefore Ui,t =
1
1−δ .
• state I, i plays O:
Agent i playing O results in a sequence of high and low love alternating;
agent i, following strategy O, starts with working full time since there is
no love in the relationship and then in the next period does not as the
partner loves him then. The resulting work by partner makes i loving in
the following period while the partner will have lost his love. Therefore
the cycle alternates between i being in love while j is not and the other
way round. This is illustrated in Table 2. Total expected utility of i will





αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 0 1 0 β
t+1 0 1 0 1 β + 1
t+2 1 0 1 0 2β + 1
t+3 0 1 0 1 β + 1
t+4 1 0 1 0 2β + 1
• state I, i plays F :
This leads to the same situation as when i plays S, so we have Ui,t =
1
1−δ .
• state I, i plays W :
By unconditionally working, agent i raises his partner’s love and keeps it
high; when his partner has fallen in love as well he switches to working as
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well so that the couple enter a steady state of high love with both working.
This is illustrated in Table 3; periods after t+ 3 will have the same stage
game action and payoff as t + 3. The total expected utility of i will then





αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 0 1 0 β
t+1 0 1 1 1 2β
t+2 1 1 1 1 4β
• state III, i plays S:
Here, the agents also enter a sequence of alternating love and work; total
expected utility of i will be Ui,t =
(β+1)+δ(2β+1)
1−δ2 . See Table 4.
.
Table 4
αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 1 0 1 β + 1
t+1 1 0 1 0 2β + 1
t+2 0 1 0 1 β + 1
t+3 1 0 1 0 2β + 1
• state III, i plays O:
The result is the same as if i played S.
• state III, i plays F :
In this case, agent i keeps his partner’s love high and thus the couple en-
ters the high love steady state with both working. Total expected utility
is Ui,t = 2β + δ
4β
1−δ ; see Table 5.
.
Table 5
αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 1 1 1 2β
t+1 1 1 1 1 4β
t+2 1 1 1 1 4β
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• state III, i plays W :
The result is the same as if i played F .
For state I we can construct the following rankings of total expected utility:
{S, F}  O ⇔ 1
1− δ
> β + δ
(β + 1) + δ(2β + 1)
1− δ2
⇔ δ < δ̂A1
(1.6)
O  W ⇔ β + δ (β + 1) + δ(2β + 1)
1− δ2
> β + 2δβ + δ2
4β
1− δ
⇔ δ < δ̂A2
(1.7)


















And for state III we have the following ranking:
{S,O}  {F,W} ⇔ (β + 1) + δ(2β + 1)
1− δ2
> 2β + δ
4β
1− δ
⇔ δ < δ̂A3. (1.8)
It is easy to see that δ̂A3 = δ̂A2.




0 δ̂A1 δ̂A2 1
state I | S/F | O | W |
state III | S/O | S/O | F/W |
both states | S | O | W |
In the above manner we can likewise derive the best response functions of i to






0 δ̂B1 δ̂A2 1
state I | S | F | O/W |
state III | S/O | F/W | F/W |




0 δ̂C1 δ̂C2 1
state I | S/F | O | W |
state III | S/O | S/O | F/W |





state I | S/F |
state III | S/O |
both states | S |
We can now take these best responses together and work out which equilibria
may emerge in this game. The result is plotted in Figure 1.1.
Proposition 1 Characterization Theorem
We have the following equilibria depending on which area in the allowable (β, δ)
space the game is set in (for the numbering of areas refer to the right part of
Figure 1.1). The equilibrium strategy pairs are depicted in (β, δ) space in Figure
1.2.
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Figure 1.1: The graph on the left shows the locations of the δ̂s in (β, δ) space.
The graph on the right shows the numbering of the resulting areas.




area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BRi(S) S S S S O W W
BRi(O) S F S F F W W
BRi(F ) S S O O O O W
BRi(W ) S S S S S S S
equilibria S − S S − S S − S
S − S
O − F S −W S −W
O − F
Proof: Follows immediately from the best responses. 
The intuition for this result is that when agents are impatient, they do not
invest into the relationship and rather resort to the ‘selfish strategy’ that yields
the highest immediate satisfaction. This means that agents who initially feel
no love towards each other remain trapped in that state. If one agent feels love
and the other does not then they enter a sequence of alternating love. In the
latter case neither is willing to sacrifice current period utility in order to lift the
couple to the full love steady state.
Unless the agents happen to start in the full love state, they will never get there.
When agents are more patient, they may co-ordinate on the selfish strategy
equilibrium but may also co-ordinate on the O−F equilibrium. In the latter, the
partners can escape the state of no love by sharing the burden of investment: in
the first period one makes the initial investment while the other invests into his
partner’s love two periods later, saving the agents from entering an alternating
sequence of love and no love.
The ‘optimistic initial investment strategy’ and the ‘keep the flame alive strat-
egy’ are thus complementary in their effort to move agents from the no love to
the full love state. This equilibrium is the closest that the agents may get to a
symmetric investment equilibrium.
Yet more patient agents will always play the shared-burden equilibrium of
O − F . If one of the agents played the selfish strategy (S), then the other
would want move in to make the initial investment thereby destroying the selfish
strategy equilibrium.
When agents are very patient then one will choose the ‘unconditional work
strategy’ meaning he will work whatever the levels of love and so propel the
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couple to the state of full love. The other agent’s best response will be to,
figuratively speaking, lay back and let the partner do the work, i.e. the selfish
strategy. The underlying reason for this best response is that the speed with
which agents reach the full love state cannot be increased by the agent whose
partner is playing the unconditional work strategy and therefore there can be
no incentive for the agent to invest. It is for this reason that even very patient
agents cannot play a symmetric investment equilibrium.
The burden sharing equilibrium is destroyed when agents are very patient: the
best response to the optimistic initial investment strategy (O) is no longer the
keep the flame alive strategy (F ) but the unconditional work strategy. This is
so because the partner that would have played F before now is patient enough
to invest early on.
It is worth noting that β is a substitute for δ in that the threshold levels of
patience that separate the discussed areas from each other are strictly decreasing
functions of the productivity of agents in household public good production. In
fact even the most impatient pair of agents may play the strategy pair S −W ,
i.e. reaching the full love steady state from an initial state of no love, if β is
close enough to unity.
The intuition to this result is simple: the higher the productivity in household
public good production, the lower the negative utility differential between work
and leisure for a non-loving agent and hence the lower the cost of investing into
the love of the partner.
1.4 Outlook: Potential for Testing
It is possible to derive testable hypotheses from the model and link these to
existing data sources.
As to the data, one can refer to a household survey panel such as the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) or the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997 (NLSY). From their questions an approximation of the savings rate of a
household can be derived which, potentially mediated by some control variables,
one can take to be a proxy for the patience of the couple (δ)8. It is also possible
8See Leece [2004] and van de Ven [2009] for similar interpretations of the BHPS data.
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to extract the approximate amount of time not dedicated to paid work which one
can take to be a proxy for the productivity of household public goods production
(β) - as more time outside work should by virtue of diminishing marginal utility
of non-spouse related activities ceteris paribus lower the opportunity costs of
spending time on things that please the partner.
In recent waves of BHPS, Self Completion Questionnaire question 3 part d) asks
the interviewee to rate how satisfied he or she is with ‘Your husband/wife/partner’
on a scale from 1 to 10. Similarly, the NLSY asks the interviewee ”How do you
feel that [your current spouse/partner] cares about you?”. While these ques-
tions are not exactly aimed at the level of love or affection towards the partner,
one can take them to be at least correlated to love (α)9. In order to control
for preference heterogeneity not accounted for in the model, in the BHPS data
one could bin observations by the responses to Individual Questionnaire ques-
tion RV94 which asks the interviewee to rate the importance of ‘Having a good
marriage or partnership’ on a scale from 1 to 10.
Hypotheses could include the following: a higher savings rate is associated
ceteris paribus with a higher score on the question serving as a proxy for love
as more patient partners have been shown to arrive in a high love equilibrium
given a wider range of values of β than less patient couples. Exogenous variance
of leisure hours, e.g. by instrumenting out with regional cyclical ups and downs
or with average of the profession, on the other hand should give an indication
of exogenous variation in β where again high values should ceteris paribus cor-
respond to higher levels of love for reasons analogous to before.
Applied for instance to an empirical framework such as Grossbard and Mukhopad-
hyay [2012], one would expect to find that these proxies for δ and β explain part
of the unobserved heterogeneity across people that is controlled for by a fixed
effects setting.
If one were to interpret BHPS question RV94 not as being informative about
preferences but rather as being a description or rationalisation of compromise in
household decision-making, then its score would be an indication of time spent
in household public good production (w). One could then compute the differ-
ence in difference of love and time spent in household public good production
9For related empirical papers working on this question in the BHPS data see Powdthavee
[2009] and Anand et al. [2005].
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which according to the assumptions of the model should indicate that the latter
increases the former.
1.5 Conclusions
The purpose of the model presented here was to illustrate the dynamics that two
people enter when they form a couple. If their mutual feelings are endogenous
to their relationship then the treatments of the respective partner, which is
exemplified in the choice of how much time one invests in household public
good production, are a strategic interaction: the better I treat him/her the
more he/she will love me, which alters his/her incentives in the future. The
parameters were chosen such that loving agents would intrinsically want to treat
their partner nicely while unloving agents would prefer not to treat their partner
nicely.
Not surprisingly, in equilibrium agents are able to lift themselves out of the
no-love state into a loving state if the costs of doing so are low enough and if
they are patient enough. From an incentive point of view, agents may be said
to realize that their partner’s and their own love is an investment good which
pays dividends by altering the agents preferences so that their utility is higher
in the loving state.
Interestingly, agents do not only invest into their partner’s love so that the
partner treats them nicely - which could be interpreted as love being a currency
that facilitates the non-simultaneous exchange of goods - but also in order to
have their own love grow in response to this nice treatment. In a strongly
simplified form, the model thus illustrates the arduous process of building deep
mutual feelings of affection, caring, trust, dependability - or, in one, love. It
also illustrates the complementarity of investments specific to one person which
makes such love hard to build and thus worth preserving.
From an application point of view, it is worth noting that for less patient agents
who face greater risk of divorce or breakup the initial level of love play a greater
role in the long run well-being of the partner. Hence, perhaps, the greater
emphasis on these in recent times10.
10This refers only to a relative shift in importance, not to any ranking in terms of well-being.
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If human preferences are indeed structured in such or similar fashion, love
could be interpreted as the facilitator that allows two people to form a productive
partnership. And this for two reasons: firstly, in a setting with little institutional
background, it provides a commitment device that makes opportunistic behavior
costly in a relationship; secondly, investment into love creates a positive feedback
into the productivity of such investment by raising one’s own love, and this
strategic complementarity focuses efforts on a single individual partner further
strengthening the couple as a productive unit.11
Promising avenues for future research include widening the scope of the
model to more explicitly include aspects like risk and long term decisions. In
the former domain one could study the effect of the possibility of divorce or
unemployment; in the latter domain joint ownership of the home and having
children could be investigated.
Both these domains would take the model closer to the central issues in empir-
ical household economics and would thus sharpen the empirical implications of
the presented model. For now, these implications are that exogenous variation
in patience as well as in ease and leisure to please the partner of one or both
partners of a relationship will partly explain levels of affection and love of both
partners.
For the latter, see e.g. Xiaohe and Whyte [1990] for an empirical investigation.








Malthus has been proven rather conclusively wrong by the last two centuries:
productivity growth has clearly been exponential as opposed to linear as posited
by him in 17981; and it is now widely believed it had been such in the preceding
centuries as well. Yet the furore his book made is a clear testament to the fact
that the answer to the question of the nature of technological growth was far
from clear in his time2.
This paper is about the implications of uncertainty over the nature of tech-
nological growth. It sets out to show that depending on the belief that the
decision-makers, or elite, hold concerning its nature, societies will embark on
very different growth paths. These beliefs are shown to be self-fulfilling in a
sense: there is more investment if growth is believed to be exponential, or ’geo-
metric’, and there is less if it is believed to be linear, or ’arithmetic’.
1See Malthus [1798].
2Even today there is considerable debate on the true nature of technological growth. For
recent contributions critical of the naive geometric interpretation see for instance Cowen [2011]
or Gordon [2012]. Then compare to for instance Brynjolfsson and McAfee [2011]
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Yet the more interesting insight is historical: in the course of time not only the
number of observations on the rewards of investment into technology increases
but also the information content of each. This is because the advancing level of
technology makes it ever easier to distinguish between these two hypotheses on
the nature of technology. The result is that, with technology in truth following a
geometric pattern, over time more and more societies will switch their beliefs in
favour of the geometric hypothesis and consequently start investing (more) into
technology. As long as there is some technological advancement therefore, the
true nature will ultimately reveal itself and global investment into innovation
and global growth will in the end take off. Growth thus begets growth.
Behind the very proximate causes of growth, it can be argued, there are
then at least three layers of subsequent causes: first the incentive structure or
the institutional setup of a society, then the perception of technology by those
who can change the rules of the game, and finally the true nature of technology
itself. It is pointing to the existence of this middle layer that is the contribution
of this paper.
The next section reviews the related literature followed by the exposition of
a simple model of extractive institutions that nests two regimes of technolog-
ical growth: exponential and arithmetic. We study the resulting decisions on
investment into innovation and in an extension also study the incentives of the
elite to adopt some inclusive institutions. The ensuing extension nests the two
regimes in a model that assumes that there is uncertainty over the nature of
technological growth. The final section concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Recent years have seen a surge of papers on the importance of institutions for
economic growth. Following North and Thomas [1970, 1973] and North [1981,
1990], institutions are usually defined as commonly known rules used to structure
recurrent interaction situations that are endowed with a sanctioning mechanism
- in short ‘the rules of the game’ of a society. When the focus is on their socially
beneficial effect, institutions are sometimes referred to as ‘social infrastructure’
that aligns private and social returns to activities; compare Hall and Jones
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[1999].
Authors such as Rodrik et al. [2004] and Acemoglu et al. [2005] argue that
an empirical causal link can be established between institutional quality and
economic performance of countries. The economic rationale of the causal link is
that institutions create or fail to create the incentives that motivate people to
invest in growth enhancing human and real capital as well as the incentives to
engage in innovative and entrepreneurial behaviour; this reasoning is put into
models in e.g. Acemoglu [2006] and Robinson [2006]. The hypothesis is that
the ultimate cause for growth lies in the institutional setup of societies while
commonly identified factors such as ”innovation, economies of scale, education
capital accumulation [...] are not causes of growth; they are growth” (North
and Thomas [1970]).
The tenet of this literature is that the institutional setup not only influences
the speed of technological advancement but also determines whether or not it
can take place at all in the modern, disruptive fashion that the Western world
has experienced since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. As introduced
in Acemoglu et al. [2001] and popularised in Acemoglu and Robinson [2012],
‘extractive institutions’ - that are tailored to the enrichment of a relatively small
elite - are considered not compatible with modern growth.
If institutions are such a decisive factor of growth and this is commonly
known, then the ensuing question, and the question that this paper contributes
a new answer to, is why such apparently inefficient institutions survive for long
periods of time. The literature has proposed a diverse range of answers so far3:
1. In some guise or other, a large part of the literature argues that institu-
tions are born out of social conflict in which groups and coalitions try to
impose institutional structures on society that further their own interest.
Such conflict is discussed for example in Gradstein [2008] and Barseghyan
and Guerdjikova [2011]. In a similar vein, dictators may prefer low aver-
age income infrastructures because the larger pie of higher incomes may
come with disproportionately higher risk of political turnover; compare
for instance De Long and Shleifer [1993]. Lastly, it may be difficult to de-
vise a system of transition towards more efficient institutions that credibly
3The categorisation builds on Asoni [2008] and Romer [2006].
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promises a ‘parasitic’ elite remuneration or compensation in the process;
see for instance Mokyr [1990], Shleifer and Vishny [1993], Parente and
Prescott [1999], Jones [2003] and Acemoglu and Robinson [2000, 2006].
2. Papers such as Knack and Keefer [1997] and La Porta et al. [1997] argue
that institutions reflect deeper cultural settings and in particular levels
of trust towards strangers. Easterly and Levine [1997] in turn posit that
ethnic diversity could be the ultimate cause of such culture.
Recent empirical investigations such as Guiso et al. [2008] and Algan and
Cahuc [2010] indeed point to a large role for generalised trust both in
cross-country comparisons and in the success of coherent subgroups of
society over time. As is evident from papers such as Fehr [2009], however,
the question whether trust is rather an independently determined factor
in economic development or a byproduct of good institutions is far from
settled.
3. Part of the literature argues that the question is framed wrongly in that
societies choose efficient institutions and apparent inefficiencies neglect
constraints on the solution. Cervellati et al. [2008] for instance argue that
oligarchies emerge when the inequality in a society is high so that the dis-
enfranchised groups tolerate the rule of the few because it is not worth
to engage in costly open contest for political power - these oligarchies are
thus efficient in a politically constrained sense.
Politically constrained institutional setups have also been studied exten-
sively over time. As examples, Huang [2012] aims to model the transitions
from one political system to another as solutions to changes in the relative
importance of factors of production while Sekeris [2011] decomposes the
(parasitic) elite and highlights the effects on development depending on
its endogenous composition.
4. A less extreme form of this approach is to say that societies choose ex
ante efficient institutional setups and that inefficient institutions are the
result of their inertia as circumstances change or new information becomes
available. As an example Sachs and Warner [1995] emphasise that after
World War II it was not so clear whether the USA or the UdSSR had the
better system. Krueger [1993] provides an example of a ’vicious circle’,
i.e. benevolent leaders or the majority choose the wrong path and this
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path then entrenches the wrong social infrastructure. Such entrenchment
is for instance modelled in Acemoglu et al. [2003, 2006, 2010] who argue
that economies that are far behind the world technological frontier can
achieve faster growth by favouring investment over innovation while for
technologically advanced economies a bias towards innovation is appro-
priate; the danger being that a policy of favouring investment may lead
to entrenched interests and thus be self-perpetuating beyond the point of
being appropriate.
This paper can be associated with group number 3: We take the existence
of a parasitic elite as given and not challenged inside the model so that the
decisions of the elite are motivated only by economic, not political, concerns.
The equilibria of our model are thus efficient in a politically constrained sense
as in Cervellati et al. [2008]. The elite views institutions as a technology by
which to produce income for itself and it is, in our model, largely down to the
perception of technology and technological possibilities whether the elite seeks
to increase its share of the pie or to enlarge the pie. For our paper politically
constrained efficiency is, however, only an assumption and a static feature of
the model, not the area of interest.
It can also be associated with group number 4: In the last extension, we
introduce uncertainty over the nature of technological growth. Societies choose
institutional setups, in the sense of tax rates, based on their beliefs concerning
this nature; wrongly believing in arithmetic growth (the limited growth case)
then translates into getting trapped in a low investment and thus low growth
equilibrium. We thus provide a different fundamental on top of which path
dependent institutional development can take place as in for instance Sachs and
Warner [1995] and Acemoglu et al. [2010].The key difference to group number
4 is that there is neither uncertainty over the efficiency of different institutional
setups nor do institutions get entrenched. Path dependency is based rather on
differences in the nature of technology and uncertainty thereof.
In the sense that growth opportunities are weighed against the share of the
output that can be appropriated by the elite, one may also draw parallels to
group number 1 of the literature discussed above, in particular Gradstein [2008].
We do not, however, contemplate political conflict in our model which we believe
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to be the defining feature of that branch.
Our argument is built in the setting of a so-called linear growth model. In
particular, we take a simplified discrete time version of the models employed in
Romer [1990] and Aghion and Howitt [1992] and extend it to nest two different
technological growth regimes as well as to accommodate the presence of a par-
asitic elite.
In a vein similar to Kremer [1993] and Galor and Weil [1993, 1999], yet from a
different perspective, we are going to argue that slow growth eventually triggers
fast growth - the difference being that the decisive variable is not the level of
the population nor the return to human capital but the perception of the nature
of technology held by the society.
2.3 Model Setup
Imagine a society composed for simplicity of exactly one serf and one aristocrat,
the former being subject to the latter. The two agents live forever; the serf works
and produces output while the aristocrat only taxes the serf and consumes. The
system is stable in that there are no rebellions or revolutions.
Imagine further that the economy of this society has the labour of the serf
as its only input factor. Output therefore depends on the labour productivity
of the serf alone, which depends on the investments into innovation in previous
periods by the serf. Specifically, let productivity of the serf in period t be given
by At.
In the notational convention of linear growth models set in discrete time, the
net output of the economy can thus be written in the following form:
Yt = (1− aL)LtAt (2.1)
Labour Lt is assumed constant and normalised to 1 (the labour of the serf). The
investment decision by the serf into innovation is represented by aL which for
simplicity is restricted to be a binary decision in that aL ∈ {0, c} with c ∈ (0, 1).
For expositional purposes, we shall now introduce the indicator variable It which
is equal to 1 if the serf innovates in period t and 0 otherwise.The dynamics of
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technology in response to investment are as follows:
At = At−1 + gIt−1
[
(1− θ) + θAt−1
]
(2.2)
The behaviour encoded in this equation is nonstandard as it adds the twist of
different growth regimes which are represented by θ ∈ [0, 1]. At the extremes,
θ = 0 makes investment return a constant g providing a scenario of linear or
‘arithmetic’ growth while for θ = 1 investment return is a constant fraction g of
productivity thus giving rise to exponential or ‘geometric’ growth. Unless stated
otherwise, we assume that the initial level of technology is equal to one, A0 = 1,
so that the initial payoff to investing is independent of the value of θ.
Utility is assumed to be linear in consumption. The serf is coerced to work
one unit of time every period but is free to decide whether to invest in innovation
or not. Output of the serf in period t is thus simply At, his only decision variable






(1− Tτ )Aτ − cIτAτ
]
(2.3)
Where c is the above introduced constant cost parameter associated with inno-
vative behaviour. Note that the cost of innovation is assumed to scale propor-
tionally with the level of technology4. c is taken as exogenous because we see the
investment into new technology as a holistic enterprise that is not scalable by
the agents at will. δ ∈ (0, 1) is the time discount parameter common to serf and
aristocrat. In order to rule out some pathological cases we restrict δ(1+g)θ < 1.
Tτ is the tax rate in period τ expressed in percentage of gross output in period
τ 5.
The aristocrat only decides on the level of the tax and his utility function is





4This can be motivated by diminishing returns in the search for new technologies. Actual
research and development spending in the United States is indeed roughly a constant fraction
of GDP.
5One could also model taxes as a percentage of net production, i.e. after having deducted
innovation costs, we are following the literature in this formulation. See for instance Acemoglu
[2006].
28
The main tension in this model stems from the facts that an increase in total
production is only possible by investment on behalf of the serf and that the fruits
of this investment are insecure from his viewpoint as they can be appropriated
in their entirety by the aristocrat. From the point of view of the aristocrat the
challenge is to take as much away from the serf as possible and still induce him
to innovate.
Before moving to the equilibrium analysis, it is instructive to consider first
the socially efficient outcome which is given by the maximised discounted sum
of net production - which happens in our case to be equal to the serf’s utility in
the absence of taxes because utility is linear in consumption.
Solving for the socially efficient outcome is simplified by the fact that it is
not socially efficient to postpone investment into innovation:
Lemma 1 Socially inefficient to postpone innovation
Let the sequence of investment decisions in an efficient outcome starting in pe-
riod t be written as IP with the investment decision in period τ ≥ t thus being
IPτ . We then have that if I
P
τ = 0 then also I
P
τ+1 = 0.
Proof: We show this result by contradiction. Let IP be a putative efficient
outcome with IPτ = 0 and I
P
τ+1 = 1 for some τ . This putative efficient outcome
being socially optimal requires output associated with the path given by IP
to be greater or equal to the output of any alternative paths. Specifically,
U serft (I






IA1 = {IPt≤n<τ , 1, 1, IPn≥τ+2} (2.5)
IA2 = {IPt≤n<τ , 0, 0, IPn≥τ+2} (2.6)
IA3 = {IPt≤n<τ , 1, 0, IPn≥τ+2} (2.7)
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n=t
δn−tAn(1− cIPn ) + δτ−tAτ + δτ+1−tAτ (1− c)+
δτ+2−tUτ+3(I
P
n≥τ+2|Tn = 0∀n) (2.8)
Ut(I
A1|Tn = 0∀n) =
τ−1∑
n=t
δn−tAn(1− cIPn ) + δτ−tAτ (1− c)+
δτ+1−t
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n≥τ+2|Tn = 0∀n) (2.11)
Where we make use of the fact that given future investment choices future
output is a linear function of the start level of technology; the constants are
labelled by A and B, they are positive and functions of IP . We thus have
Uτ+3(I
P
n≥τ+2|Tn = 0∀n) = A + B. If IP was the socially optimal, then the
following three conditions have to hold:
Ut(I
P |Tn = 0∀n) ≥ Ut(IA1|Tn = 0∀n) ⇐⇒
δ2(A+B) ≥ −cAτ + δ
[
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We are now going to show that these three conditions cannot hold simultane-
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(1 + θg)Aτ + (1− θ)g
]
≡ ĉ2 (2.16)
Inequalities (2.15) and (2.16) are easily shown not to be satisfied simultaneously
as ĉ1 > ĉ2. 
The intuition behind this result is possibly made more accessible by the
following sequence of logic: imagine that the agents are very patient so that
δ → 1, then postponing an investment makes no sense as the discounted utility
cost stays the same while the discounted utility gain is lower. So the agents
would have to be impatient in order to let IP beat IA3.
They cannot be be all too impatient though, because very impatient agents
would prefer simply not to invest. There is thus a lower bound on δ to allow
IP to beat IA2. This lower bound will obviously relate to A, meaning the
influenceable part of the stream of output after τ + 1, because that captures the
return of investment.
The putative optimality of IP then breaks down in the comparison with the last
alternative, IA1. In order to support the lower bound on δ needed for IP to beat
IA2 we would need A to be high, so high as to make the invest in both periods
alternative IA1 beat IP . It is a sort of vicious circle that makes it impossible for
IP to be simultaneously more efficient than all alternatives.
We have thus shown that investment is never postponed in the socially opti-
mal outcome which leaves just three candidate scenarios for the social optimum:
Proposition 2 The socially efficient path of investment
The socially optimal path of technology is characterised by one of the following
path of investment into innovation:
1. Iτ = 0∀τ ≥ t, ‘never invest’, iff A0 ≥ gδ(1−θ)c(1−δ)−gδθ ≡ Â
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Figure 2.1: This diagram shows the regions defined in Proposition 1 in the pa-
rameter space of θ and A0. The regions are mutually exclusive and exhaustive;
they are labelled as in the Proposition and marked by grey boxes. Note that the
behaviour of Â changes depending on whether c is greater or smaller gδ
1−δ and
thus on whether the ‘always invest’ case exists or not.
2. Iτ = 1∀τ ≤ n and Iτ = 0∀τ > n iff A0 < Â and θ < c(1−δ)gδ ≡ θ̂
3. Iτ = 1∀τ ≥ t, ‘always invest’, iff θ ≥ θ̂
Note that the last path only exists if c < gδ
1−δ . The areas spanned by these
conditions are depicted in Figure 2.1.
Proof: From Lemma 1 it follows immediately that there can only be these
three candidate sequences. To determine which of these candidates is the socially
optimal, one then employs the following algorithm: Compare the discounted sum
of production in case one stops investing in period τ to the one in case one stops
in period τ + 1:
Aτ
1− δ
> (1− c)Aτ + δ
Aτ + g[(1− θ) + θAτ ]
1− δ
⇒ In = 0 ∀ n ≥ τ (2.17)
The threshold level of technology that is thus never surpassed immediately fol-





This threshold is very intuitive: the higher the value of the future, the less costly
innovation, and the more productive innovation is the longer it is beneficial to
keep innovating. As long as Aτ < Â investments are productive so that the
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social optimal outcome is given by letting Iτ take the value of one as long as
Aτ < Â and zero otherwise.
If the denominator of Â becomes negative there is no upper bound on technology;
this is the case under the following condition:




To simplify the exposition and because it is uninteresting, we rule out the
never invest social optimum by setting c < gδ
1−δ so that we have Â > A0 = 1.
This also implies that c < gδ
1−δ and so θ̂ ∈ (0, 1).
The economic intuition of these results is that there is either a strictly pos-
itive or strictly negative feedback cycle between the level of technology and
investment. If it is positive then investing into technology is self-reinforcing and
thus the optimal outcome coincides either with the always invest or the never
invest scenario. If the feedback cycle is negative, however, then large levels of
technology make further investments into technology prohibitively costly. Inde-
pendent of the trajectory of Iτ up until period t, once such level of technology
is reached the optimal further trajectory is given by the never invest scenario.
This feedback cycle can be demonstrated by the comparison of the ‘never
invest’ and ‘always invest’ scenarios. The values follow from simple arithmetics:
∞∑
τ=t






δτ−t[Yτ |Iτ = 1∀ τ ] = (1− c)
[
At
1− δ(1 + gθ)
+
g(1− θ)
(1− δ)[1− δ(1 + gθ)]
]
(2.21)
Next, by taking derivatives, we compare the impact of an increase in the level
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1− δ(1 + gθ)
(2.23)
Higher levels of technology mean that the cost of innovation is higher as the costs
scale proportionally with technology - this is captured by the numerators of the
quotients of the two equations above. Insofar as θ > 0 there is a counteracting
effect in that the future increases of technology are also proportional to the level
of technology and therefore scale as well - this is captured by the denominators
of the quotients. Intuitively, the positive effect is more likely to be stronger
the closer θ to 1 - in other words, the closer the trajectory of technology in the
always invest scenario is to an exponential function with base (1 + g).
It is easily calculated which of the two effects is stronger depending on the
parameters. And this yields an alternative derivation of θ̂:
1− c




⇔ θ > c(1− δ)
δg
= θ̂ (2.24)
Referring back to the short discussion above of the extreme values of θ = 0
and θ = 1 and their correspondence to ‘arithmetic’ and ‘geometric’ growth
trajectories, we shall henceforth define as ‘arithmetic growth’ the case of θ ≤ θ̂
and define as ‘geometric growth’ the case of θ > θ̂.
Under arithmetic growth, the socially optimal path of investment is to invest
up until technology reaches the level of Â and then not to invest any more.
Pushing technology further down the frontier would be self-harming as the cost
of innovation is greater than its benefit; the reason being that costs of innovation
scale faster with the level of technology than the return of investment. Under
arithmetic growth therefore, technology exhibits a similar behaviour as capital
in classical macro models: it has a steady state value in which maintenance and
investment equilibrate.
Not so under what we call geometric growth: the return on investment into
innovation scales at the same rate as the cost of investment and therefore a
positive differential survives into eternity. Consequently, the socially optimal
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path of investment is to invest indefinitely. This is clearly how most scholars of
economics today would describe technology.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
We consider only subgame perfect Nash equilibria in grim trigger strategies. As
for equilibrium selection, we assume that the aristocrat may choose his preferred
pair among all strategy pairs that would induce such an equilibrium.
The focus on grim trigger strategies is motivated by expositional simplicity
and it is justified by the following two aspects of the setting. Firstly, switching
to the highest tax rate forever and switching to never innovating, respectively,
represent the strongest credible punishment options available to the two agents.
secondly, punishments in our setup cannot happen by accident which means
alternative punishment strategies like two phase strategies, that would allow
agents to forgive past deviations of the respective other agent, do not unlock
higher efficiency of the equilibrium outcome.
2.4.1 Geometric Growth (θ > θ̂)
In the case of geometric growth, the socially efficient outcome is achieved by
continual investment into innovation. In a world of grim trigger Nash equilibria,
the aristocrat will thus strive to find a strategy pair according to which the serf
is just willing to innovate in every period. For that to be the case the serf has
to be compensated for the cost of innovation and be motivated not to cheat.
Since taxes cannot exceed 100% and the decision over innovation is under
the discretion of the serf, the minimum utility of the serf will be 0 in equilibrium
(the never invest scenario with Tt = 1 ∀ t). It is therefore immediate that the
aristocrat will have to compensate the serf for the cost of innovation, which is
cAt, if the serf is to innovate. In equilibria with innovation, the tax rate therefore
has to be T ∗t ≤ 1− c in all periods t.
A putative equilibrium in which the aristocrat plays Tt = 1−c if the serf has
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played Iτ = 1 for τ < t and Tt = 1 otherwise and in which the serf plays It = 1
if the aristocrat has played Tτ = 1− c for τ < t and It = 0 otherwise, however,
would be destroyed by a deviation of the serf: by not investing in period t,
the serf would increase his current period t utility by cAt and suffer no loss in
utility in the following periods. This profitable deviation is made possible by the
assumption that the the two agents move simultaneously, so that the aristocrat
can only react in the following period.
In order to render such a deviation not profitable, the aristocrat would have
to grant the serf a rent which he can threaten to withdraw in the event of a
deviation. The discounted sum of the flows of this rent have to be at least as
high as cAt in order to provide sufficient incentive to the serf.
If we label such a rent flow as RtAt, it is immediate that, from the point of view
of the aristocrat, the optimal flow of this rent will grow at the same rate as the
serf’s payoff to the deviation - which is equal to the rate of technological growth.




δτ−tRτAτ ∀ t (2.25)
The rent flow thus critically depends on the rate of growth of the technology.
We can be more specific on this rate: when A0 = 1, as we assumed above, then
in the initial period growth comes from the geometric part of technology in the
proportion of θ and from the arithmetic part of technology in the proportion of
(1 − θ) - with the growth rate from period 0 to period 1 being equal to g. As
the level of technology grows, an ever larger share of further growth comes from
the geometric part; in fact, in the limit it completely crowds out the arithmetic













From this follows that in the long run the arithmetic part of growth plays a
negligible role in the determination of Rt. And if that is the case, then equation
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1− δ(1 + gθ)
= Rlrδ
At(1 + gθ)
1− δ(1 + gθ)
⇒ Rlr = c[1− δ(1 + gθ)]
δ(1 + gθ)
(2.27)
This equation only holds in the long run, when the level of technology is very
high. Initially the growth rate is higher and therefore a lower share of the future
output stream is sufficient to keep the serf from deviating. We can calculate the
corridor within which Rt is going to move by calculating the hypothetical case
of a growth rate of g forever; which is equivalent to the edge case of θ = 1 so
that we can use equation (2.27):
Rmin =
c[1− δ(1 + g)]
δ(1 + g)
(2.28)
We conclude that Rt monotonically increases over time and moves in a corridor





We can now formalise the highest possible tax rate that provides a rent flow
whose discounted sum is equal to the one period deviation payoff of the serf; we
simply define T ∗t as 1− c−Rt.
From the point of view of the aristocrat, a tax rate regime of T ∗t provides the
highest possible share of the output under the restriction that the serf is induced
to innovate. We therefore define the following pair of equilibrium strategies: the
aristocrat plays Tt = T
∗
t if the serf has played Iτ = 1 for τ < t and Tt = 1
otherwise; the serf plays It = 1 if the aristocrat has played Tτ = T
∗
t for τ < t
and It = 0 otherwise. It remains to be checked under what conditions the
introduced strategy pair constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Consider the serf first: off the equilibrium path the serf expects the aristocrat
to play Tt = 1 and his best response to that tax rate is not to innovate, as
required.
On the equilibrium path he receives a rent flow of RtAt every period - which he
expects to lose given any deviation of his. His only possible deviation is not to
innovate which by construction yields the same expected discounted payoff as
the equilibrium strategy - so the serf has no incentive to deviate.
Consider now the aristocrat: off the equilibrium path the aristocrat expects
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the serf not to innovate, there is thus no reason for him to constrain his urge to
confiscate all production and set Tt = 1, as required.
On the equilibrium path the aristocrat receives a discounted payoff that is









; his actual payoff is
higher because the former value is calculated using the upper bound of Rt. His
best deviation is switching to Tτ = 1 for τ ≥ t which would yield an expected
discounted payoff of At
1−δ as he expects the serf to stop innovating. The aristocrat
will thus not deviate if the parameters of the model are such that:





1− δ(1 + gθ)
+
g(1− θ)





Intuitively, this inequality is more likely to hold the more patient the agents are,
the faster technology progresses on the equilibrium path and the more it does so
in a geometric fashion; it is less likely to hold the higher the cost of innovation.
We can be more specific by isolating At on the right hand side:
δg(1− θ)(1 + gθ)− c ≥ At
[
c− δ(1 + gθ)2
]
(2.30)
The discussion so far can now be consolidated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Equilibria under Geometric Growth
We consider two types of grim trigger Nash equilibria:
• ‘no investment equilibrium’ in which the aristocrat plays Tt = 1 and the
serf plays It = 0 for all t
• ‘continual investment equilibrium’ in which the aristocrat plays Tt = 1 −
c − Rt = T ∗t if the serf has played Iτ = 1 for τ < t and Tt = 1 otherwise
and in which the serf plays It = 1 if the aristocrat has played Tτ = T
∗
τ for
τ < t and It = 0 otherwise




0, gδ(1− θ)(1 + gθ)
]




gδ(1− θ)(1 + gθ), δ(1 + gθ)2
)
⇒ the never invest equilibrium exists
and the continual investment equilibrium exists if At ≥ δg(1−θ)(1+gθ)−cc−δ(1+gθ)2
• c ∈
[
δ(1 + gθ)2, 1
)
⇒ only the no investment equilibrium exists
Proof: The intervals of c follow immediately from Equation (2.30) and the
discussion in the preceding text. 
Compared to a world with no aristocrat, the socially optimal outcome is
realised for narrower ranges of the parameter values because the decision-maker
considers incentive costs of Rt which are irrelevant from a social point of view;
the economy is therefore potentially loosing efficiency. Yet if the parameter
values are such that the aristocrat chooses to induce the serf to innovate then
we see technology progressing on the socially optimal path.
Our setup thus replicates the basic tenet of the literature on economic in-
stitutions in that extractive institutions are suboptimal because they destroy
or dilute incentives to undertake growth enhancing investments. The problem
arises from the fact that not only does the person directly concerned with the
investment into innovation need to be motivated but also the rent extracting
member of the elite; this more complicated incentive structure increases the
private costs of innovation over and above the social costs.
2.4.2 Arithmetic Growth (θ ≤ θ̂)
In the case of arithmetic growth the socially optimal outcome is achieved by con-
tinual investment up until technology reaches a certain level and no investment
afterwards.
In the chosen framework of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in grim trigger
strategies this outcome is not attainable. The reason lies with the fact that the
incentive structure is that of a finite sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas which pre-
cludes co-operation for the same inexorable logic as a finitely repeated prisoner’s
dilemma.
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Proposition 4 Equilibrium under Arithmetic Growth
The equilibrium under arithmetic growth is for the aristocrat to set Tt = 1 ∀ t
and for the serf to set It = 0 ∀ t.
Proof: We show that an equilibrium with investment into innovation does not
exist and proceed in the following four steps:
• There is no equilibrium with investment taking place indefinitely because
in that case technology would also grow indefinitely and with it the nega-
tive return on investment. Investment has to stop after a finite number of
periods.
• Compensation of the serf cannot be deferred to the period after invest-
ment into innovation has stopped as this would not violate the incentive
compatibility of the aristocrat and hence subgame perfection.
• Investment by the serf cannot take place after compensation has run its
course as that would violate the incentive compatibility of the serf and
hence subgame perfection.
• The last period in which investment is undertaken and compensation or
rent granted cannot be incentive compatible as both aristocrat and serf
would want to deviate to full taxation and no investment, respectively.

In this setup, we have a clear policy credibility problem. Both aristocrat
and serf would prefer an outcome that involves a finite sequence of investment
by the serf which is compensated by some tax break arrangement. We are thus
touching on the vast literature on policy credibility: if we included uncertainty
over the preferences of the aristocrat one would possibly reach settings in which
the ideas of papers such as Backus and Driffill [1985] and Athey et al. [2005]
could fruitfully be applied. Even though full credibility is not reached in their
setup because some of the assumed uncertainty surrounding the preferences of
the committing party remains in existence from the point of view of the other
party, certain moves by the committing party can sway expectations of the
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other party and thus partly resolve the credibility issue. In our setting, this
could take the form of the serf being uncertain whether the aristocrat has the
utility function assumed throughout the paper or an altruistic one that cares
about the payoff of the serf as well.
Commitment devices can be constructed, however, more closely within the
constraints of the setup. We turn to one such device in the ensuing section.
2.5 Extension A: inclusive institutions as a com-
mitment device to a fixed tax rate
Suppose the aristocrat had the option to choose, before the game begins, whether
or not to install some inclusive institutions. If he chooses not to then the game
is the same as in the above section. If he chooses to set up such institutions
then this enables him to commit to a fixed tax rate of his choosing - he will, in
the game that ensues, not be able to change the tax rate away from this fixed
rate.
2.5.1 Geometric Growth Regime (θ > θ̂)
If the aristocrat wanted to implement a rent for punishment purposes as in the
equilibrium of the preceding section, he would need no such institutions.
We therefore need to consider the alternative only, which is to motivate the
serf to innovate by giving him a sufficient stake in future production in cases
that the punishment equilibrium is not attainable. The aristocrat would thus
effectively grant a constant share of all production to the serf and this share
would be enshrined as the complement of the fixed tax rate or 1− Tfixed. This
is how for the purposes of this section we define inclusive institutions.
The aristocrat would want to set Tfixed as high as possible and it is easy to
calculate how high is feasible. Write Tfixed as 1− c− ε which shows that the serf
needs compensation for the investment cost plus a reward which is captured by
ε > 0. Then for the serf to innovate it must hold that his discounted payoff given
41
continual investment must be at least as high as his discounted payoff given no
investment into innovation.
In order to ease the exposition, suppose for a moment that the aristocrat
can vary ε from period to period while the serf expects the current period εt to




1− δ(1 + gθ)
+
g(1− θ)





Alternatively, by some rearrangement we have:
εt ≥
c[1− δ(1 + gθ)]At
gδθAt + g(1− δ)
(2.32)
By definition, however, ε has to be fixed by the aristocrat before the game begins
and cannot be adjusted afterwards. For innovation to be always lucrative to the
serf, it must therefore be set such that the above equation holds for any value





c[1− δ(1 + gθ)]
gδθ
>
c[1− δ(1 + gθ)]
δ(1 + gθ)
= Rmax (2.33)
This means that whenever the threatened punishment equilibrium of the previ-
ous section is feasible the aristocrat will not set up inclusive institutions. One
may perhaps say that motivation by reward is costlier than motivation by pun-
ishment or that conditional rents are cheaper than unconditional ones.
With a slight added condition, this result also holds in a setting in which εt
need not be fixed but can be varied over time. In such a setting, the aristocrat
is not forced to set ε at the highest level needed over time but can let it increase
over time towards that level thus capturing more of the output.
A lower bound on εt can be derived from Inequality (2.31) by setting At to
the lowest possible value of 1. Note that this bound is lower than the actual
lower bound as in equilibrium the serf will anticipate the increases in εt and
therefore require a higher current period share as opposed to the derivation of
Inequality (2.31) which assumes a stable expected εt. But this lower bound is
6An algebraic note: the relationship holds for all values of θ since ε is decreasing in θ and




c[1− δ(1 + gθ)]
gδθ + g(1− δ)
>
c[1− δ(1 + gθ)]
δ(1 + gθ)




For practical purposes it is safe to assume δ > 0.5 which covers all admissible
values of g.
Being thus shown to be more costly, this second mechanism to reach the
socially optimal path of continual investment into innovation does not extend
the range of parameter values for which the socially optimal path can be reached.
Inequality (2.30) still holds. Inclusive institutions are thus both expensive and
unnecessary under the regime of geometric growth.
2.5.2 Arithmetic Growth Regime (θ ≤ θ̂)
In this growth regime one would naively expect the option of setting up inclusive
institutions to be a lot more valuable. After all, without it the pair is stuck in
a no growth equilibrium precisely because of the lack of a commitment device.
Unfortunately, this is not quite so.
Consider again the optimal strategy of the aristocrat given inclusive insti-
tutions which again can be written as Tfixed = 1 − c − η where we changed ε
to η in order to avoid confusion. The serf will innovate in any period in which
innovation raises his discounted payoff. The serf will stop to innovate if a last






g(1− θ) + gθAt
1− δ
]




From this we can calculate the threshold for η:
η ≤ cAt(1− δ)
δ[g(1− δ) + gθAt]
− c (2.36)
The intuition is clear: the higher the growth rate, the lower the cost of innova-
tion, the more patient the agents, the more periods the serf will innovate. As




) and so the higher the level of technology
the higher η needs to be to induce the serf to innovate, as required.
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The aristocrat will now optimise over the total number of periods that the
serf would choose to innovate given η, call this number T̂ . This optimisation
has a unique solution as the benefit of increasing T̂ by one period is decreasing
in T̂ while the cost of doing so is increasing in T̂ . The reason for this is again
the arithmetic nature of technology if θ ≤ θ̂.
We proceed to the comparison of the payoff to the aristocrat given inclusive
















The crux of this solution is evident in the comparison of these terms: the rent
granted to the serf will continue to hurt the aristocrat forever, long after it has
served its purpose. Under arithmetic growth, inclusive institutions in the sense
of a permanent limit in taxes are simply very costly to the aristocrat.
Thinking a bit outside the model there is another crux here: the very credi-
bility of inclusive institutions is problematic. It is clear to all participants that
the aristocrat would want to use them as a temporary measure and will try hard
to abolish them once growth has run its course - yet in order to do their magic
they need to be permanent. This internal inconsistency would in practice have
forestalled most attempts towards successfully implementing such institutions.
One can think of slightly more sophisticated tax regimes that would counter
this potential commitment problem. One way would be to let the lower tax rate
be conditional on past investment behaviour of the serf. In its simplest form this
would mean granting the serf a lower tax rate and hence a share of the output
for a fixed number of periods after an investment activity.
While this would not materially change the cost of providing the serf enough
incentive to invest - there is little scope for arbitrage as the two have the same
linear utility function over output and the same time preference - but it would
potentially mediate the mentioned commitment issues in a psychological sense
by limiting the cost exposure of the aristocrat to a finite number of periods.
In fact, the fixed period tax breaks for foreign direct investment in special
investment zones may possibly be seen as an example of such responses.
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Figure 2.2: This diagram shows two sample paths of technology given continual
innovation and one of the two regimes respectively; the dashed and lighter line
marking the geometric growth regime (Aa0 = A
g
0 = 100, g = 0.00734, a = 1,
σ2g = 0.25 and σ
2
a = 50). When history is not far advanced the two series are
clearly difficult to distinguish.
2.6 Extension B: Uncertainty over the Nature
of Technology
We now introduce uncertainty into the model by augmenting the dynamics of
technology by random fluctuations. We do not aim for a complete analysis
but rather point towards some of the possible implications. To simplify the
exposition, we concentrate on the extreme cases of θ = 0 and θ = 1.
The trajectories of technology under these two cases are characterised by the
following two equations:7:
geometric growth: At = At−1(1 + gIt−1)e
εgt with εgt ∼ N(0, σ2g) (2.38)




t ∼ N(0, σ2a) (2.39)
Where we have renamed g to a in the arithmetic case to avoid confusion. The
levels of g and a as well as of σ2g and σ
2
a cannot be compared directly, but they
can be chosen such that they induce very similar looking fluctuations. For an
example see Figure 2.2.
7To be precise, one would have to assume that technology cannot fall below a certain
positive constant under either regime in order to prevent technology from turning negative or,
in the case of Equation (2.38), getting stuck at zero.
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To keep things very simple, we assume that, conditional on the growth
regime, all parameters are known with certainty; the remaining uncertainty
being firstly whether technology is generated by Equation (2.38) or (2.39) and
secondly the future realisations of εg or εa. Suppose further that the pair of aris-
tocrat and serf is Bayesian, starts out with some prior assigning probabilities to
both regimes and updates this common belief according to the following simple
rule.
A sage measures the level and change of technology every period and reports
which of the two growth regimes is more compatible with the observation. He
decides in favour of the regime whose standard score is closer to zero, that is
for which | εt
σ
| is smaller. Note that, conditional on the regime, εt is an observed
value in this setup.
The belief of the aristocrat and serf pair can then be represented by the mean
of a beta distribution where the output of the sage is transformed to 1 if he
reports ‘geometric’ and 0 otherwise; we label this mean or probability assigned
to the geometric case as pg. The belief, in period t since the start of time, over




with αt = α̂ + k and βt = β̂ + t− k (2.40)
Where k is the number of time the sages has reported geometric up until and
including period t and where α̂ and β̂ parameterise the prior. This is admittedly
a very simplified setup: not only is information lost by the discretisation in
general but increasingly so as technology advances.
Next, suppose that the sage decides every nth period whether to let the game
of the two be based on the premise of geometric or on the premise of arithmetic
growth. They then play the game, somewhat unrealistically, as if they were in
the certainty case of the main model section.
The decision of the aristocrat can be formalised in the following way: denote the
aristocrat’s payoff given that the pair plays believing in arithmetic growth when
the true nature is indeed arithmetic growth as Uarist (A|a); denote his payoff if
the pair plays believing in arithmetic growth when the true nature is geometric
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) + δnE[Uarist+n(At + na)] (2.43)
Uarist (G|g) = (1− δn)
1− c−R




The decision-rule of the aristocrat can be formalised as follows:
(1− pg)Uarist (A|a) + pgUarist (A|g) ≤ (1− pg)Uarist (G|a) + pgUarist (G|g) ⇔ invest
(2.45)
Where ‘invest’ is a shorthand for the aristocrat inducing the serf to innovate by
granting him a rent through Tt = T
∗
t < 1.
We can further simplify by letting n → ∞ which renders Equations (2.41)
to (2.44) substituted into (2.45) more easily readable:
















The interpretation is intuitive: the left-hand-side represents the payoff from
the no-investment case while the right-hand-side represents the cost multiplied
with the expected reward of the investment case. The latter is the sum of the
arithmetic regime reward of the investment case and the probability-weighted
uplift to that under the geometric regime.
We can now draw the following simple conclusions from this extension intro-
ducing uncertainty:
If a, g, σ2a, σ
2
g and A0 are chosen such that the fluctuations of the two regimes
are rather similar around the initial value of technology A0 and if the pair of
aristocrat and serf happens to start off with a prior that lets the aristocrat de-
cide not to innovate then this decision is going to have a strong tendency to get
perpetuated for want of observations outside the range of similar behaviour of
the two regimes. If the true regime is geometric growth, then change towards
innovation may come only by some serendipitous discovery or a disaster, i.e. a
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very high or very low εt, which nudges the trade-off in favour of innovation: by
pushing At far away from A0 such discovery would make the regimes distinguish-
able via the different effect of a change in the base technology on multiplicative
and additive errors. The probability of whether or not the road to technological
growth will eventually be taken or not will thus be a function of σ2a and σ
2
g .
The converse is not true: if again a, g, σ2a, σ
2
g and A0 are chosen such that
the fluctuations of the two regimes are rather similar around the initial value of
technology A0 and the rates of growth are comparatively small then a pair with
a prior that induces innovative behaviour faces substantial chance of abandoning
the path of innovation for want of clearly observable indications for geometric
growth. And once having reverted to the no investment case, it is difficult to
start innovating as noted above.
In an informal manner, we have thus argued that, under conditions that
plausibly reflect the setting of mankind for most of its history, extractive in-
stitutions offering no incentive for innovative behaviour form a near-absorbing
state. If, however, innovative behaviour is allowed, by some fortuitous chance, to
be pursued long enough for the compound effect of geometric growth to become
clearly visible then the investment into innovation case becomes an absorbing
state.
Once broken free from insufficient faith in technology, humanity will eventually
converge onto a path of constant investment into innovation.
2.7 Discussion
In this paper we have aimed to show that at the heart of the the questions of
(1) what institutions a society adopts and (2) what trajectory of technological
growth it enters lies the perception of the nature of technology.
On a fundamental level, we relate perceptions and policy choices: if tech-
nology is viewed as stagnant or potentially growing linearly - or ‘arithmetic’ as
we call it - then an elite that lives off extracting resources from the rest of the
populace will not implement growth friendly policies. The reason need not be
that these policies yield insufficient rewards, it is that the elite cannot credibly
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commit to reward the efforts that are required by the exploited. A not so ob-
vious corollary is that the perception of technology of the exploited populace is
as important as the perception of the exploiting elite.
If a society believes in the promise of exponential - or ‘geometric’ - growth, how-
ever, elites do not stand in the way of growth and instead set up extractive or,
if those are not feasible, even inclusive institutions that facilitate investments
in innovation. It is important to note the strategic complementarity of growth
friendly institutions and the perception of technology.
Going one step further it can be argued that one would not only expect the
two to emerge closely together but also that institutions follow beliefs. Apply-
ing this idea for instance to the United Kingdom of the post Elizabethan era
one may, as with so many cases of laws of the past, assert that the take away
message of patent laws is possibly not that they encode a functioning system
but rather that they reflect with what measures the elite hoped to improve its
situation - the laws should thus be read as testament to the belief in the promise
of technological growth.
In a historical perspective, the tipping point for technological advancement
comes then not from the movement from extractive to inclusive institutions
but from a change of perception by the ruler or ruling class of a society. They
need to realise or understand the potential of technological change and find in-
stitutional arrangements that, from their perspective, mitigate the dangerous
side-effects.
One may interpret the economic rise of China since Deng Xiaoping as both anec-
dotal evidence to this hypothesis and as a very large scale experiment thereof.
Finally, we argue that - given technology grows indeed in a geometric rather
than arithmetic manner - growth friendly institutions are more likely to be
adopted as history progresses and more and more decisive observations become
available on the returns of investment into technology. It is from this positive
feedback cycle that we draw the conclusion that, in the end, growth is the
fundamental driver of growth.
The final prediction of the model is one of global convergence. As the potential
productivity of workers further outgrows the value of commodities, taxation of
market economies becomes ever more attractive.
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Chapter 3
A critical literature review of the
Property Rights Theory of the
Firm and the communication of
Unprotected Information Assets
3.1 Introduction
For anyone interested in information gathering, processing, storing and so on we
live in truly exciting times. Not only is the exponential trend in the develop-
ment information technology making itself felt across more and more industries
previously untouched; and the term of the knowledge worker, human capital,
intellectual property and innovation in the centre of many discussions on eco-
nomic growth and competitiveness; but also there is the emerging ecosystem of
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin that promise to revolutionise the documentation
and storage of information, ideas and ownership.
And yet, the currently dominant theoretical framework for the study of or-
ganisations, the Property Rights Theory of the Firm, is prima facie agnostic to
the role of information as an asset in the economic production process.
One may wonder whether information is truly just like any physical asset. Specif-
ically, one is led to ask whether information is indeed purchasable like other
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assets; the closest equivalent to purchasing physical assets is the purchase of
patents, but these cover only a very narrow set of possible information based
assets. One is also led to ask whether a strict rivalry assumption is appropriate.
In short, information is likely to be in need of special treatment in the framework
of Property Rights Theory. And these questions are increasingly pressing as our
economies are moving towards being ever more heavily based on information
processing and knowledge.
In this survey, we review a recent and emerging literature that employs Cheap
Talk in organisational settings where asymmetric and unverifiable information
warrants a careful consideration of the allocation of decision-rights. From our
point of view, this literature is closest to answering the kind of questions that
the presence of unprotected information assets pose in Property Rights Theory.
We are going to conclude, however, that the literature so far has not properly
answered the question of how the virtual and ephemeral nature of information
affects their ownership properties and their implications.
3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 The Property Rights Theory of the Firm
The property rights theory of the firm may be said to form the basis of our
current understanding of the theory of the firm. It in turn grew out of the
transaction costs literature that followed Coase [1937] and refined it by provid-
ing an explicit mechanism that leads to both costs and benefits of organising
economic activity inside organisations rather than arms-length via the market.
The essence of the property rights theory of the firm is captured in just two
papers: Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990].
In Grossman and Hart [1986], transaction costs are made concrete by in-
centive misalignment arising from dispersed ownership of assets. Building on
earlier work of Klein et al. [1978] and Williamson [1979], the starting point is “a
situation in which it is prohibitively difficult to think about and describe unam-
biguously in advance how all the potentially relevant aspects of the production
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allocation should be chosen as a function of the many states of the world” (page
696). In the first period of a two period world, the right to decide in such a
situation is then given to the owner of the asset - ownership is thus defined as
conferring residual control. In fact, ownership in its usual meaning of control
and power indeed arises only if not all future decision-making can be contracted
upon beforehand.
The analysis is simplified by letting renegotiation in period two be cost-
less as well as information symmetric, so that actions are contractible ex post
and thus in period two an efficient outcome is achieved. The distribution of the
realised surplus depends on the distribution of ownership and through this chan-
nel discretionary investment activity in period one is sensitive to the ownership
structure; where discretionary means that the investment is not contractible.
This is why ownership matters.
The central insight is that ownership is allocated such that the ex-ante invest-
ment decisions are distorted as little as possible. The boundary of firms therefore
reflects the sensitivity of ex-ante investment decisions to the bargaining over the
ex post surplus. Suppose there are two assets that require investment, then if
heavy investment in one of these yields more ex post output than heavy invest-
ment in the other or moderate investment in both then the owner of this one
asset will acquire the other asset as well; the party whose high level of invest-
ment is important is given high bargaining power. If investment in both assets
is about equally important then non-integration will dominate.
In Hart and Moore [1990], the focus is widened from control being exercised
completely by one party or the other party (in the sense of atomistic assets for
single agent use), to one where assets are used by more than one party and hence
one can refer to an owner and the workers he employs to work with this asset.
The meaning of residual control rights is interpreted in this setting as meaning
that the owner can selectively exclude agents from the use of the asset.
As in Grossman and Hart [1986], the solution concept is based on the idea
that agents trade or assign ownership such that the ex-ante investment decisions
are distorted as little as possible, so that they are second-best. Some common
wisdom and stylised facts of actual ownership structures emerge naturally out
of the model: if only one person invests, then he should own all assets; com-
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plementary assets should be owned by one person or entity; if an asset affects
the marginal benefit of only one agent then he should own it; and if an agent is
indispensable to an asset then he should own it irrespective of whether he invests
into the connected venture or not. The latter point is a strong departure, or
important extension, from the results of Grossman and Hart [1986].
Information is not considered as separate asset in this model, but rather as
a part or a byproduct of investments1. Asymmetric information is mentioned,
however, as one of potential barriers to efficient ex-post negotiation in both
papers.
In general terms, certain types of information are clearly assets as they can
be put to use such that output is generated; all technological know-how falls
into this category. At the same time, information is a complicated asset in the
framework of the Property Rights Theory because residual control rights are not
necessarily granted by society in the sense of the literature. Hart and Moore
[1990] define the residual control as the right to exclude agents from the use of
the asset: while this is by construction possible when it comes to information
embodied in well defined and enforced patent rights, it is far from clear how less
well protected assets will be handled in this framework.
In more general terms, the Property Rights Theory of the firm applies only
to protected assets and little attention has gone to the effect of the presence of
unprotected assets on the equilibrium and its welfare properties.
Some of this attention has gone into how private and non-verifiable information,
hence unprotected once revealed, can be incorporated into the productive use of
another asset. The literature on this question centres on a principal that takes
investment decisions and has no direct access to some useful piece or pieces of
information that reside with an agent or scattered over multiple agents. The
solution concepts draw on the insights into communication equilibria concerning
non-verifiable information with partial incentive alignment of Crawford and So-
bel [1982] and the question of allocated decision-rights in the spirit of Grossman
and Hart [1986] and Hart and Moore [1990]2. We turn to and focus on this
1Which in Hart and Moore [1990] are restricted to investments into human capital.
2There are other approaches in the literature to the question of how unprotected informa-
tion may be traded; of those touching upon property rights only those have been included in
this survey that are explicitly grounded in Property Rights Theory and that draw on commu-
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literature now.
3.2.2 A single biased agent with soft private information
The first paper to explore the implications of having the control over a physical
asset separate from the control over pieces of information crucial to the produc-
tive use of said asset - and using cheap talk following Crawford and Sobel [1982]
- is Dessein [2002]. This paper, and indeed the whole ensuing literature that
is the focus of this essay, departs from the classical property rights literature
in assuming that ownership of the physical asset and information asset are not
grouped ex-ante in order to minimise ex-ante distortions; instead, communica-
tion mechanisms are explored that aim to alleviate the consequences of thus
separated control.
The setting consists of a principal and an agent where the principal selects
a project from a set of projects of whose profitability the agent is privately
informed; the principal therefore seeks to utilise the agents’s knowledge. The
principal is initially in control of some asset or resource critical to any of the
projects and then has to decide how to place this control between the agent and
herself. It is assumed that projects or actions cannot be contracted upon and so
the principal is left with only two options regarding this allocation of decision
rights: either let the agent report on his information and then decide herself; or
fully delegate the choice of the project to the agent.
The allocation of decision-rights may be interpreted as the analogue of or sub-
stitute for the allocation of ownership rights.
The agent reporting his information is cheap talk as communication is cost-
less and the information non-verifiable or soft. Cheap talk à la Crawford and
Sobel [1982] is possible because apart from the agent’s constant bias the prefer-
ences of agent and principal move in unison depending on the private information
of the agent so that, firstly, different types of agents have different preferences
over the principal’s actions and, secondly, agent and principal preferences are
not completely opposed.
nication of non-verifiable information; as an example of those not included we refer to Anton
and Yao [2002].
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More formally, projects differ along only one dimension and the chosen
project can therefore be represented by a scalar number y. The utility of the
principal Up and the utility of the agent Ua both depend on this choice y and a
random number m with known distribution with support [−L,L] whose realisa-
tion is observed by the agent alone:
UP (y,m) = UP (m,m)− lP (|y −m|) (3.1)
UA(y,m) = UA(m+ b,m)− lA(|y − (m+ b)|) (3.2)
where b > 0 represents the agent’s bias and lP (·) and lA(·) are convex functions
whose derivative is zero at the origin. Under delegation, the agent thus imple-
ments y = m+b and therefore the payoff to the principal is Up = UP (m+b,m)−
lP (b).
Without delegation, the agent and the principal engage in communication
and one can apply the framework of Crawford and Sobel [1982]: according to
their Theorem 1, communication takes the shape of a partition of [−L,L] and
the agent reporting which of these partitions m falls into; the intuition is that
by partitioning the message state and thus the response of the principal into
discrete steps the agent is forced to choose between an over-reaction and an
under-reaction by the principal. One can think of this added noise as destroying
an infinite loop of correcting the message by principal and counter-correcting
the message by the agent. Partitions are defined by a boundary condition that
disallows arbitrage by letting the agent be indifferent between two partitions
should the value of m fall on the boundary of these3.
The surprising result is that for m being uniformly distributed it can be
shown that whenever a cheap talk equilibrium is possible (i.e. the bias not too
large) then it is better for the principal to delegate the decision-making. She
thus either makes an uninformed decision or delegates - consulting the agent
and deciding based on his report does not occur.
The intuition behind this result is that the intervals that make up the partition
are increasingly large as one moves towards the higher end point. This is due to
the aforementioned indifference condition: Let a0 and a1 define the first interval
3In terms of equilibrium selection, Dessein [2002] argues that agent and principal will
coordinate on the ex-ante Pareto superior equilibrium if this exists (which is always the case
if m is uniformly distributed). It is given by the equilibrium with most partitions.
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and a1 and a2 the second; then the principal will set y1 = (a0 + a1)/2 and
y2 = (a1 + a2)/2 for the respective intervals and thus at m = a1 the agent must
be indifferent between y1 and y2. This means that a1 = (y1 + y2)/2− b needs to
hold which in turn translates into the following:
a2 − a1 = a1 − a0 + 4b (3.3)
By induction one can thus conclude that the interval lengths grow linearly by
4b. This is intuitive, as the agent has a positive bias and thus needs to add
more noise for recommending large projects; in other words and a bit loosely,
without costly noise that distorts his information the agent cannot make his
recommendation of a large project credible. And with large increases in the
interval lengths the average length of an intervals is necessarily high; so high
that the principal is on average further away from her optimal project under
communication than she would be by delegation.
One can interpret this result as a replication of the finding of Hart and Moore
[1990] that complementary assets should be owned by one agent. By deferring
the decision-right to the agent, the principal is effectively moving the ownership
of her assets to the agent who also owns the information asset. Even though
investment decisions are prima facie absent from Dessein [2002] the choice of the
project serves the same fundamental purpose of creating a first period decision
space on which the second period outcome depends.
More importantly, the communication equilibrium can be interpreted as a
transfer of ownership over the information asset from agent to principal. While
the framework of the Property Rights Theory assumes the transfer of ownership
to be lossless, in the world of unverifiable information and divergent incentives
such transfer incurs costs in the form of distortions. Dessein [2002] can therefore
be understood as a probe into the relaxation of the lossless ownership transfer
assumption of Property Rights Theory. Viewed from this angle, the paper’s
main result points to the hypothesis that agents holding key information are
indispensable agents in the sense of Hart and Moore [1990].
There are papers that raise questions very similar to Dessein [2002]. Among
these are Alonso [2008] and Harris and Raviv [2005]. The latter for instance
examine a setting that differs only in that the principal also holds private infor-
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mation regarding the profitability of the potential projects. While the general
implications are similar, the fact that complementary information is split in
its initial ownership means that neither agent is necessarily indispensable as in
Dessein [2002].
The tentative conclusion regarding information as indispensable asset does
not hold, however, in more general and complex settings; when information is
dispersed among more than one agent, for instance, costly transfers of owner-
ship will occur if the pieces of information are sufficiently complimentary in the
generation of output. It is to such settings that we now turn.
3.2.3 Multiple agents and horizontal versus vertical com-
munication
The first paper to consider the implications of information assets being dis-
persed over more than one agent in the setting discussed in this survey is Alonso
et al. [2008]. In particular, the authors study the setting of a multi-divisional
organisation consisting of two divisions named j ∈ {1, 2} and, potentially, a
headquarters. Profits of the organisation are given by:
π = π1 + π2 (3.4)
πj = Kj − (dj − θj)2 − δ(dj − d−j)2 (3.5)
where dj ∈ R are the decision variables of the organisation and θj are random
variables which represent pieces of information local to the divisions and so only
available to the respective division manager; they are uniformly distributed with
support [−sj, sj], with sj > 0. We can thus interpret the decision variable dj
as adapting the offering of the organisation to the idiosyncrasies of market of
division j which is captured by θj.
δ ≥ 0 captures the degree to which there are gains from coordinating the de-
cisions d1 and d2 concerning the two divisions; this may be motivated by pro-
ductivity gains from standardising products, more synergy potentials etc. For
expositional simplicity, the authors set K1 = K2 = 0.
If ownership could be transferred without cost then the local information of
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division managers would go to headquarters eliminating the information asym-
metry. Headquarters would then implement the first best solution by aiming at
maximising total profit:
d∗j =
(1 + 2δ)θj + 2δθ−j
1 + dδ
(3.6)




−j = (θ1 + θ2)/2 as δ
goes to infinity. Via the parameter δ the setup thus spans all degrees of the trade-
off between adaptation to division-specific market demands and coordination on
a uniform product.
For δ = 0 the profit function of the headquarters is a simplified version of the
principal’s utility function in Dessein [2002] with UP (m,m) = Kj, lP (x) = x
2
and θj distributed uniformly. This more specific form allows farther-reaching
analytical manipulations that we shall come to now4.
The agent’s preferences are set up differently in that the bias is not a constant
added to the optimum of the organisation but shift towards the ‘own’ division’s
contribution to the total profit of the company; more specifically, the preferences
of the manager j are λπj + (1− λ)π−j with λ ∈ [0.5, 1].
Actions are non contractible; more specifically, the organisation can only
commit to allocating decision rights ex-ante. Similarly to Dessein [2002], the
organisation can choose between the options of delegation, referred to in the
context of this paper as decentralisation, and centralisation in which the head-
quarters decides herself.
Communication takes place in either option: when managers have the right to
decide on the dj themselves they send a message to each other, named ‘horizon-
tal communication’ by the authors, while they send a message to headquarters
in the other case, this is named ‘vertical communication’.
Decision-making given posterior expectations takes the following forms. Un-
der centralisation, the headquarters follows Equation (3.6) with θj replaced by
E(θj|m1,m2) where mj stands for the message sent by the manager of division
4Compare to the worked out example for uniform distributions of the sender’s signal in
Crawford and Sobel [1982] which has become the prime reference point for subsequent research;
arguably due to its better tractability.
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Figure 3.1: We reproduce the time line from the figure in the original paper; this
is Figure 1 in Alonso et al. [2008].
j:
dCj =
(1 + 2δ)E(θj|m1,m2) + 2δE(θ−j|m1,m2)
1 + dδ
(3.7)
Under decentralisation one needs to account for the divergent preferences of
the managers as well as as the different information structure: now θj is known





Substituting the decision-making structure of the other manager one can reduce
















and likewise for dD2 .
When incentives are perfectly aligned, that is λ = 0.5, then managers report
the value of the observed θ truthfully so that both the decisions under centrali-
sation (Equation (3.7)) and under decentralisation (Equation (3.9)) collapse to
the profit maximising decision outlined in Equation (3.6). With λ > 0.5, how-
ever, preferences between observers and decision-makers diverge and therefore
managers have an incentive to misrepresent their observations.
We follow the authors in examining the incentive structure of misrepresen-
tation before moving to the equilibrium discussion.
Considering centralisation first, it is straightforward to see that headquarters
places too much weight on coordination between divisions relative to local adap-
tation from the point of the view of the division managers. If θ1 > 0 for instance,
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manager 1 would expect the full information case decision of headquarters d∗1 to
lie on (0, θ1) because the unconditional expectation of θ2 is zero and manager
1 receives no information concerning θ2; in particular, he would expect d
∗
1 to
be lower than the value of d1 that maximises his expected payoff because head-
quarters puts less weight on the adaptation to the local conditions of division
1 than manager 1 would want her to. Intuitively therefore, he has an incentive
to exaggerate his information so as to push headquarters’ belief over the value
of θ1 higher. This desire to move the belief of the headquarters to a more ex-
treme value can be formalised in the (misguided) posterior of headquarters that
maximises the expected payoff of manager j:




Clearly, for λ > 0.5 we have bC > 0 as well as
∂bC
∂λ
> 0 and ∂bC
∂δ
> 0. The more
biased managers are and the greater the need for coordination, the more extreme
or exaggerated managers would want the posterior beliefs of headquarters to be
regarding the θ pertaining to their division. Note, however, that incentives are
aligned in the case of θj = 0.
In the case of decentralisation, one can again derive the posterior belief over
the value of θj, this time held by manager −j, which maximises the expected
payoff of manager j. This takes the value of θj + bDθj where bD =
(2λ−1)(λ+δ)
λ(1−λ)+δ .
As in the case of centralisation, for λ > 0.5 it holds that bD > 0 so that
the manager again exaggerates his information and increasingly so as the bias
increases, ∂bD
∂λ
> 0. The rationale, however, is different: since manager j sets
dj himself there is no loss in the adaptation to local conditions from his point
of view, instead there is perceived a coordination deficit as manager −j puts





, so that the incentive to exaggerate increases more sharply in
the decentralised setting; the intuition being that not only does the bias of the
manager sending the message increase but also the recipient manager’s whom
the first wants to influence.
But the decisive insight is that ∂bD
∂δ
< 0. The reason is that, again from the point
of view of manager j, manager −j puts too little weight on coordination and
higher values of δ, i.e. higher need for coordination, reduce this divergence of
preferences. One can therefore expect that the relative performance of horizontal
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communication compared to vertical communication improves as coordination
becomes more important.
This is indeed the case. Similar to Crawford and Sobel [1982]5, in the commu-
nication equilibrium the space of [−sj, sj] cut up into intervals that increase in
length as one moves away from zero6. Defining one such interval i by [aj,i−1, aj,i]
the arbitrage condition between intervals can be written as:
aj,i+1 − aj,i = aj,i − aj,i−1 + 4baj,i (3.11)
Notice the similarity to Equation (3.3). The parameter b stands for the above
defined bC or bD depending on whether the communication is embedded into the
centralised or decentralised organisational setup; the incentive to misrepresent
one’s signal in order to induce more extreme posterior beliefs at the receiver of
the message therefore directly translates into noisy communication.
Expected profits of the organisation under the two regimes centralisation and
decentralisation are then derived by substituting the posterior beliefs resulting
from the communication subgame into the decision-making logic captured by
Equations (3.7) and (3.9), respectively.
The resulting relative payoffs of the two regimes define regions of dominance in
the parameter space spanned by λ and δ. We reproduce the resulting plot from
the paper in Figure 3.2.
The intuition is as follows. When managers exhibit only a very small bias,
i.e. low values of λ, then decentralisation is always the preferred option, even
when the need for coordination is very high. The reason is that horizontal
communication improves as the need for coordination increases. In a sense,
the coordination deficiency of decentralisation is healed endogenously, while the
exogenous medicine of centralisation suffers from increasingly noisy communi-
cation.
5The difference to Crawford and Sobel [1982] lies in the facts that (1) there are two senders
instead of one in the game of Alonso et al. [2008] and (2) that the incentives of sender and
receiver are completely aligned in the case of θj = 0. The latter point is also responsible
for there being no finite upper bound on the number of intervals that can be supported in
equilibrium.
6Equilibrium selection is again based on an efficiency argument, the organisation is assumed
to coordinate on the equilibrium with the most detailed communication and hence highest
expected profit.
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Figure 3.2: We reproduce the regions of dominance in the parameter space
spanned by λ and δ; this is Figure 6 in Alonso et al. [2008].
When the need for coordination is very small, i.e. low values of δ, then likewise
decentralisation is always preferred. The reason is that the bias of managers
has no adverse effect on local adaptation under decentralisation but worsens lo-
cal adaptation under centralisation because the latter relies on communication
which suffers under high bias.
When both the need for coordination and the bias of managers is high then
centralisation performs better. This is for two reasons: as discussed above, ver-





); second, managerial bias distorts the decision-making away from
coordination whereas headquarters does not suffer from this (again compare
Equations (3.7) and (3.9)).
Independently and concurrently to Alonso et al. [2008], Rantakari [2008]
developed a very similar model. The chosen setup is essentially the same as in
Alonso et al. [2008], only the scope of the analysis is broadened in two directions
and narrowed in one direction. In particular, the implication of asymmetries
between the divisions is explored in depth and more governance structures are
considered. In the main body of the paper, Rantakari [2008] does not allow for
varying degrees of bias of the managers, holding this constant at the maximum
at λ = 1 in the above introduced notation.
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The profit function of the organisation is given by:
π = π1 + π2 (3.12)
πj = Kj − kj
[
(dj − θj)2 − rj(dj − d−j)2
]
(3.13)
where Kj = 0 for convenience in this paper as well. This profit function is the
same as Alonso et al. [2008] for kj = k−j and rj = r−j, i.e. if divisional asym-
metries are removed. The distributions of the θj and the information structure
of the game is the same as in Alonso et al. [2008].
The set of available governance structures is extended to include partial
centralisation and directional authority which respectively refer to headquarters
deciding on the variable dj of the centralised division j whereas the other decides
on d−j herself and to one of the divisions subordinated to the other division in
that one division manager holds all decision rights.
By marginalising out the idiosyncratic parts of the scopes of the two papers,
the results of the equilibrium analysis can be checked for consistency. The
lengths of the communication intervals discussed in detail above shall serve as
an example here. They are reported in the following format by Rantakari [2008]:
|aj,i+1 − aj,i| − |aj,i − aj,i−1| =
4
ϕdeci




where the notation of the boundaries is changed to the one introduced above
in Equations (3.3) and (3.11). As above, we have Eiθj = 0 in equilibrium; and
further we have 1
ϕdeci




kj = k−j and rj = r−j we can transform the profit function of Rantakari [2008],
see (3.12), into the one of Alonso et al. [2008], see (3.4), by setting
rj
1−rj = δ.
As expected, the results coalesce as one moves to the ground of common as-
sumptions.
From the perspective of Property Rights Theory of the Firm, these two
papers can be seen as probing into the relaxation of yet another assumption,
namely that the use of assets is rival. While the case of the usage of information
being completely non-rival is trivial in that ownership does not matter then, the
horizontal communication case is interesting because it moves towards non-rival
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as managers retain separate decision-rights and at the same time communicate
(in a distorted manner).
The two discussed papers show that even very high output interdependencies do
not lead to the allocation of residual control rights over the information assets to
a single agent if the pieces of information are sufficiently close to being non-rival.
This is a strong qualification of the standard implications of Property Rights
Theory.
As a side note, the comparison of Alonso et al. [2008] and Rantakari [2008]
is a nice illustration of serendipity in the progress of science. By any measure,
except for the degree of bias of the managers, Rantakari [2008] offers the more
complete and wider ranging analysis; equilibrium relationships and values are
derived in a unified framework across all governance structures and performance
comparisons extend from a preference mapping onto the parameter space and
verbal intuition to analytical dissection of the equilibrium profit into losses due
to biased decision-making and due to strategic communication. Yet the central
result of Alonso et al. [2008], namely that for relatively low bias decentralisation
dominates centralisation even for very high needs of coordination, was missed
in Rantakari [2008]. One may perhaps even say that this is the only insight of
the union of two papers that is surprising and thus adds to general knowledge.
Rantakari [2008] was very close: the critical intuition driving this result is men-
tioned7 and in an extension, he considers varying degrees of bias. In the pertain-
ing figure, one can basically see the dominance of decentralisation for symmetric
divisions with the naked eye, see Figure 3.3.
One may wonder whether a sparser setup with fewer degrees of freedom in the
profit function would have made the result more likely to be discovered.
7”However, as we increase the dependency of the divisions further, the quality of decision-
making starts eventually improving. The reason for this is that as the divisions become
highly dependent, the agents have no option but to coordinate if they want to maximize the
profitability of their divisions.” See p. 20. He elaborates further on p. 26: ”We can see that
while the quality of communication is always higher under centralized authority than that
under decentralized authority, this difference is decreasing in the importance of coordination
to either division.”
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Figure 3.3: These figures show the efficient organisational structure given differ-
ent interdependency levels between divisions. The left diagram shows the relative
performance for λ = 0.7 while the diagram on the right shows the relative per-
formance for λ = 0.55. This is Figure 8 in Rantakari [2008]. For a comparison
with Alonso et al. [2008] focus on the dashed diagonal lines running from bottom
left to top right of the respective diagrams as they chart the case of symmetric
divisions with a varying degree of interdependence. We see that for λ = 0.7 and
high coordination needs, centralisation beats decentralisation, while the diagram
for λ = 0.55 shows that decentralisation all but dominates centralisation. In
Figure 3.2, the dashed diagonal lines would show as two vertical lines crossing
the x axis at 0.55 and 0.7, respectively. The dominance of decentralisation for
low bias is then evident.
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3.2.4 Endogenous managerial bias
The decisive factor determining to what extent the use of nonverifiable informa-
tion is rival or non-rival is the degree to which the incentives of agents diverge.
It is therefore natural to turn to the question of how this degree is determined.
One approach to answering this question can be found in Dessein et al. [2010]
who move from exogenously given biases of agents towards question of organ-
isational design that yield biases endogenously as the outcome of a trade-off
between competing demands on the incentive structure of agents.
More precisely, Dessein et al. [2010] is concerned with the question of how
an organisation should be designed if (1) parts of the value chain of its business
units have synergetic potential through standardisation across units, (2) poten-
tial standardisation decisions have to be delegated to a functional manager by
headquarters, and (3) standardisation may hurt sales by ruling out adaptation
to local market conditions.
Strategic communication in the form of cheap talk recedes in importance as
tailoring incentive structures takes centre stage.
The organisation in question consists of two business units which in turn
consist of two business processes, production and sales; production has syner-
getic potential while sales does not. Headquarters has two options to choose
from: non-integration, i.e. function as a financial holding with two operatively
separate business units let by business unit managers, or integration, i.e. hire a
third manager to oversee production and standardisation decisions.










(veri −∆iI + εci)−
∑
i
(C − veci −
k
2
I + εci) (3.15)
where i ∈ {1, 2} indexes the business units, R and C stand for revenue and
cost, respectively. eci and eri denote effort levels of the managers where under
non-integration business unit manager i decides on both eri and eci while under
integration ec1 and ec2 are decided by the functional manager. v denotes the
productivity of effort. I takes the value of 1 if under integration the functional
manager decides to standardise and 0 otherwise; synergy shows in a cost reduc-
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tion of k which is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, K] while
the non-adaptation costs lower revenues in market i by ∆i where the latter takes
the value of ∆ > 0 with probability p and 0 otherwise. k is known to the func-
tional manager while the business unit managers know their respective ∆i. εri
and εci represent environmental volatility drawn from normal distributions with
mean 0.
Profit maximisation thus requires solving two challenges: first, inducing




; and second, setting the right incentives for the standardisa-
tion and adaption trade-off for the functional manager. Note that the second
challenge only materialises in the case of integration.
In the models reviewed so far the principal or headquarters was unbiased and
took decisions herself in the case of centralisation. Centralisation in the context
of Dessein et al. [2010] takes the form of integration and introduces a third self-
centred agent into the picture and therefore the challenge or question is not only
how to transmit the private information of agents towards the central decision-
maker but also how to let this new third party make use of this information to
the benefit of the organisation.
Inducing effort is achieved by sharing the surplus, by assumption in the way
of linear contracts. In this regard, additive mean zero normal disturbances are
a convenient way of expressing the decision-making logic of agents with con-
stant absolute risk aversion. The basic rationale behind output volatility and
risk-averse agents, however, appears to be that such setup implies that giving
the functional manager a stake in volatile revenues, which are untouched by his
exerted effort, is costly in that compensating lump sum transfers from agent to
organisation have to be lower than the expected compensation from this stake.
In order to solve the second challenge it is nonetheless beneficial for the organi-
sation to give the functional manager a stake in the revenue flow. Without such
stake the manager would only care about the cost side and completely disregard
the adaptation loss stemming from standardisation.
The driving assumption behind the need for this stake is that standardisation
is non-verifiable, which means the functional manager has complete discretion
in his decision-making. The first rationale given is that it is difficult to judge
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for an outsider to what extent standardisation has taken place and whether
it is was surplus generating in expectation or not; while this argument feels a
bit forced the second relates convincingly to the overall setup by referring to
a sort of verification and decision-making overload which will have prompted
the delegation of this activity to a third party agent in the first place and thus
renders verification impractical.
In a first-best world, standardisation is of course implemented iff k > ∆1 +
∆2. Under non-integration, it is never implemented while under integration the




(∆1 + ∆2) which
intuitively means that the functional manager will use the first-best threshold
in his decision-making only if his incentives are balanced equally across revenues
and costs as in the organisational profit function.
Completely balancing these incentives and thus achieving first-best decision-
making regarding standardisation is very costly, however, as both raising the
stake of the functional manager in revenues αFr to the level that represents
the optimal level of stake in costs under the effort inducing aspect is costly
for the reason discussed above while lowering the stake in costs αFc obviously
leads to prima facie inefficiently low effort levels eci. Dessein et al. [2010] show
that at the optimum the balance is tilted towards excessive standardisation and
thus managerial bias is endogenously determined and consciously chosen by the
organisational designer.
Communication of ∆1 and ∆2 takes the form of a very simple cheap talk
game: since at ∆i = 0 there is no incentive conflict between sender and receiver
(business unit manager and functional manager, respectively) ∆i = 0 is truth-
fully reported; at ∆i = ∆ the sender has an incentive to overstate ∆i which
he cannot do because the highest value ∆i can take is ∆ and hence also this
number is truthfully reported.
In a sense this is a logical next step of simplification from Alonso et al. [2008]
who introduced the complete incentive alignment of agent and principal for the
case of the variable of interest taking the value of zero.
The question of communication appears in earnest only in an extension to
the baseline model. The extension changes ∆i ∈ {0,∆} to ∆i ∈ {∆L,∆H}
with both ∆L and ∆H greater zero. This way truthful communication is not
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Figure 3.4: This diagram charts incentive costs depending on the importance of
effort v. Note that αFc > α
F
r for all relevant values of v so that we have excessive
standardisation in expectation; αFc is lower than the second best stake α
∗∗
c so that
the functional manager exerts too little effort; these two observations mark the
optimal trade-off between effort and alignment. Note lastly that for sufficiently
high value of effort synergies from integration are not pursued. This is Figure 2
in Dessein et al. [2010].
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possible in the setting discussed so far as the business unit managers would
always have an incentive to overstate the value of ∆i. To overcome this difficulty
in communication, business unit managers must be given a stake in cost savings
so as to better align their incentives with the interests of the overall organisation.
The result of this new setup is that the organisational designer either (1)
gives business unit managers a stake in cost savings and softens their effort
incentives - very similar to the case of the functional manager - so as to induce
communication or (2) does not give such incentives and leaves communication
incredible altogether. Not surprisingly, further divergence of incentives makes
the integration case less attractive as adapting incentives to ease communication
flows harms effort incentives.
From the perspective of classical Property Rights Theory, asset ownership in
this setup clearly should go altogether to the functional manager as his invest-
ment choice (effort levels can be interpreted as such) and his residual control over
standardisation together are central to the outcome and it is not clear what the
headquarters is for. From a more abstract perspective, the setup of the model
is one of lumped and inseparable assets (effort levels and information) in which
the costs of asset transfer in the form of communication are created because
their elimination would make the distribution effects of the irrevocably wrongly
allocated overall ownership (to headquarters instead of the functional manager)
overly expensive.
In a sense, the departure from the standard case of costless asset transfer is
thus motivated with the departure from the standard case that all assets can be
transferred.
Dessein et al. [2010] take a large step towards explaining where diverging
interests between managers in different roles and between managers and share-
holders stem from and why they may be efficient in a second best sense. The
setup, however, is to some degree unsatisfactory in that it introduces uncertainty
into the payoffs of the organisation purely to make revenue share incentive con-
tracts costly. And this is problematic both from a methodological point of view
and from an empirical point of view.
Methodologically, this shifts the burden of being an ad hoc assumption from the
question of why managers have biases to question of why providing incentives
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to them should be costly. The chain of causality is extended, but its beginning
is only a little less ad hoc and its choice clearly motivated by the effect it has on
the model outcomes. Empirically, the relationship between risk and incentives is
not as clear cut as a naive reading of Dessein et al. [2010] suggests. At the latest
since Prendergast [2002] it is known that the degree of delegation is related to
the risk of the activity carried out by a firm and hence cannot be factored out
as exogenous when relating risk and incentives. Due to this endogeneity, it is
not so clear empirically whether such a negative trade-off exists between risk
and the cost of incentives.
Similar to the close relationship between Alonso et al. [2008] and Rantakari
[2008], there is a close relationship between Dessein et al. [2010] and Rantakari
[2013]8.
Rantakari [2013] expands the scope by letting the organisational designer
choose the degree of interdependence between the divisions or their ‘operational
integration’ rather than assuming this parameter to be exogenous. In the nota-
tion of Dessein et al. [2010], the designer thus would have been given a trade-off
schedule or menu of values of K and ∆(K)9. The scope is simplified by reducing
the number of divisions to two and making them symmetric which also reduced
the complexity of the revenue share incentive contracts to the degree in which
they are based on the performance of the manager’s own division or the per-
formance of the overall organisation. Exertion of work effort is reinterpreted as
managerial investment into information acquisition.
The main finding of the paper can be summarised as follows. When the
environment is more volatile in the sense the divisional private information has
greater variance and hence greater importance in the overall profit function then
organisations tend to be structured in a decentralised way with incentives fo-
cused on divisional performance. This relationship between decentralisation and
environmental volatility is due to the endogenously chosen degree of interdepen-
dence between divisions which is reduced when volatility is higher. This is to
be expected since greater dispersion of local adaption parameters increases the
cost of aligning divisions and with a fixed trade-off schedule over K and ∆(K)
8Further variants of these models include that of Friebel and Raith [2007].
9We are free to translate Rantakari [2013]’s setup also as ∆ and K(∆) as Rantakari [2013]
assumes a strictly monotonous trade-off schedule.
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the optimal level of interdependence should drop in a well behaved system10.
The above mentioned open questions regarding the results of Dessein et al.
[2010] apply to this paper as well; and the concern that an ad hoc assumption
is simply moved to a higher level of complexity applies as well to the way that
interdependence between divisions is introduced.
Lumping of inseparable assets can take different forms from the one discussed
in these two papers. The simples such lumping is the ownership over two pieces
of information; we are turning to one such case now.
3.2.5 Career concerns induced communication equilibria
Ozbas [2005] is an interesting paper because it arrives at a very different moti-
vational concrete setup from the papers above even though on an abstract level
his setup can be seen as an extension of Dessein [2002]. The agent of Ozbas
[2005] does not only own information regarding the the project asset but also
regarding his own ability. The interesting twist added here is that the transfer
of information assets is not only costly, it is also only possible when there is
competition between agents in a dynamic setup.
To be precise, Ozbas [2005] studies a two period setting in which managers
report the quality of the respective projects they sponsor. Quality can either
be high, RH , or low, RL, and managers are of two types, good and bad (g and
b, respectively). Manager types differ in the sense that bad managers only find
and sponsor low quality projects while good managers find good projects with
probability µ ∈ (0, 1).
After the managers report the quality, headquarters allocates the investment
budget to fund projects based on the information in the reports; the investment
budget is assumed to be smaller than the would be required to fund all projects.
Managers prefer having their projects funded over not having them funded and
prefer having good projects funded. Headquarters maximises the expected payoff
from the chosen projects.
10On a side note, it is interesting to see the cheap talk theory to advance: while equilibrium
selection had been handled informally based on intuitive efficiency considerations in the papers
reviewed so far, Rantakari [2013] is able to refer to Chen et al. [2008] for an equilibrium
refinement leading to minimised information loss.
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Figure 3.5: This diagram charts the possible project outcomes that good and bad
managers may have originally entitles Managerial Talent and Project Outcomes.
From the perspective of headquarters, the prior probability of a manager being
of the good type is β ∈ (0, 1)
Ozbas [2005] also deviates from the previous papers by not not using a variant
of the Crawford and Sobel [1982] simplified example as his model of cheap talk.
Rather, cheap talk arises from the following three characteristics of the setup11:
1. The reports of the managers are soft or non-verifiable as well as costless.
2. In the first of the two periods, incentives of principal and agent are neither
completely aligned nor completely opposed as good managers with low
quality projects may want to signal their type by truthfully reporting
the low quality. Their rationale is that if foregoing funding today by such
truthful reporting raises the likelihood of getting funded in the future then
only managers who expect to have a high quality project in the future with
positive probability will have an incentive to truthfully report and therefore
headquarters will indeed raise the likelihood of funding such managers in
the second round because their posterior belief over whether the manager
is good or not rises from β to 112.
3. From the previous point follows that good managers with low quality
projects and bad managers have different preferences over the actions of
11Interestingly, Ozbas [2005] does not name the communication in his model cheap talk and
even though he includes Crawford and Sobel [1982] in his references he does not cite them in
the body of the paper.
12The seemingly innocuous and rather ad hoc assumption that managerial utility increases
in the profitability of the overseen projects is thus crucial to the working of the model.
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the principal; while good managers may in equilibrium prefer the principal
not to fund them in the first period and change her beliefs, bad managers
want the principal to fund their projects.
Cheap talk is thus induced by career concerns. The theme of organisational
design is then based on this setup in the form of varying the number of man-
agers that are competing for funding. The background to this is that the more
managers there are, the more patient a good manager needs to be in order for
the logic of point 2 above to work. Centralisation or integration thus trades
off economies of scope that allow the organisation to concentrate its funding on
good managers and diseconomies of scope that make it more difficult to identify
good managers.
Based on this finding, Ozbas [2005] explores, to some degree, ideas such as job
rotation, rigid divisional capital budgets and depth of hierarchies.
This paper develops the bare minimum version of his setup idea. The model
makes do with the lowest possible variability in project and managerial quality
as well as the lowest possible number of periods. It should therefore possibly be
interpreted as a proof of concept of a certain approach rather than a finished
direction of the literature. Richer payoff structures and a richer setting of man-
agerial types would allow deeper probing questions to be answered in a nuanced
way as well testing the robustness of the results.
3.3 Discussion of future avenues for research
In the preceding section we aimed to show how Cheap Talk as a modelling device
can be applied to shed light on the implications of unprotected information
assets in the framework of the Property Rights Theory of the Firm. We have
documented the diversity of motivational setups in the approaches as well as
their connections from the point of view of classical Property Rights Theory.
There appears to be an exciting interplay between structure and uncertainty
in the environment, business processes within the organisation, its incentive
structures, and its communication flows. We now argue that the literature has
only taken its first tentative steps and that most questions are still unresolved.
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In particular, we review three aspects that we think deserve revisiting on behalf
of the community: (1) several enriching aspects of the principal agent setting
that were introduced in early papers of the literature have been cut away in
ensuing papers; (2) the effects of a dynamic setting have been largely left out
of the analyses; (3) giving further structure to the question of dynamic settings,
agents have scarcely been considered as people with long term career concerns.
We review these aspects in turn.
Of the aspects whose examination was started and has not been continued we
mention two. Alonso [2008] explores the effects of delegating tasks to the agent
that can be either substitutes or complements. This interaction of activities has
been translated into setting of more than one agent solely as standardisation
synergies. One would expect to find further insight by generalising the multi-
agent setup to include multi-type activity interaction as well.
A second such lost feature of the setup is private information residing with the
principal as in Harris and Raviv [2005]. While one may argue that keeping
the setup lean and simple allows for sharper results and clears the view for the
important insight (compare the discussion of Alonso et al. [2008] and Rantakari
[2008] above), a subsequent check for the robustness of the attained results with
regards to such simplifications appears reasonable.
As for the effects of a dynamic setting, we draw on Baker et al. [1999] who
examine a repeated principal agent setting where, depending on where private
information resides, either the principal builds a reputation for not overriding the
informally delegated decision-rights of the agent or the agent builds a reputation
for using the received decision-rights in an appropriate manner. Baker et al.
[1999] do not consider communication, however, and one would expect the latter
to play an important role in such informal delegation. Yet possibly the only
paper to move dynamic settings into the focus of the considered literature is
Alonso and Matouschek [2007] which embeds a simple variant of one of the one-
shot models of Crawford and Sobel [1982] into an infinitely repeated game setting
with a long lived principal and a sequence of short lived agents. Yet, as Baker
et al. [1999] illustrate, the precise setup of private knowledge and commitment
power can tilt the outcome of such a setting into different directions; the role
and effect of strategic communication of soft information should therefore be
considered to still be an open question.
75
A further dynamic aspect of organisation is that they can fail. And yet, to
the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that considers the possibility of
bankruptcy13. One can imagine for instance that small companies with a high
probability of failure (like startups) whose structure is such that the efforts of an
employee significantly influences this probability naturally leads to more aligned
incentives and thus better communication.
Linked to the above, one can imagine that even in more conventional organisa-
tional settings dysfunctional communication and decision-making that severely
lowers the survival likelihood of the organisation is limited by some equilibrium
selection mechanism building on the collective interest of the members of the
organisation.
Lastly, one can argue that agents are people with a future, and that they have
careers that they care for and which they develop. Ozbas [2005] has spearheaded
this idea in the field of communication between headquarters and managers and
assignment of decision-rights. Taking up the idea of Alonso et al. [2008] one
may wonder, however, whether the addition of horizontal communication in his
setting may attenuate the incentive problems faced by headquarters in the many
managers case.
One may further conjecture that the empirically observed large payoff differen-
tials between levels of seniority are deliberately designed to boost the incentive
aligning effects of career concerns underlying the model of Ozbas [2005].
Career concerns can also be framed in terms of informal evaluations of
the performance of colleagues. Similar to the examined setting of evaluating
projects, one may again have heterogeneous partial incentive alignment with
headquarters. If such setting is then embedded into an overlapping generations
model we would expect interesting relationships to emerge. In such a model,
one could then also explore the effects of horizontal versus vertical performance
evaluations as well as activity interactions.
On a more fundamental level, we want to argue that the literature is missing
the abstract view we aimed to show as unifying theme in the above discussions.
It is our belief that it is going to be more fruitful to examine the implication
of asset classes like information that are potentially partially unprotected and
13The paper that possibly comes closest is Holthausen and Rønde [2004], but bankruptcy
is confined to one contained player in the organisational setup.
76
partially non-rival in the framework of classical Property Rights Theory rather
than to focus on examining the logic of the setups that are chosen to illustrate
and motivate the analysis of individual papers. The current impression is that
the literature is stuck in niche applications due to its focus on exactly these
motivational setups.
To give a concrete example, realising that distorted communication is effec-
tively a cost of transferring assets naturally leads to the question what other
mechanisms may, in concert with distorted communication or on their own,
make the transfer of information assets costly. And that question would lead to
connections to themes such as Chinese whispers or the cost of learning to make
sense of information - compare for instance Garicano [2000].
3.4 Conclusions
The fundamental insights of the surveyed literature can be summarised in two
simple points.
When information as an asset is unprotected, the transfer of its ownership
rights can be costly due to distortions in the communication that stem from
misaligned incentives. In the framework of Property Rights Theory, ownership
is defined as having residual control which in the case of information takes the
form of decision-rights. The immediate implication is that the allocation of
ownership and decision rights with the least ex-ante distortion is different.
The second fundamental insight is that information assets may be non-rival
to some degree. The implication of this is hat non-integration may be favoured
also in circumstances that in the traditional view of assets would clearly have
called for an integrated organisational structure.
One may perhaps argue that the literature is a replication of the old adage
of “knowledge is power” following Bacon in a new form: key information is the
asset that makes agents indispensable in the sense of Hart and Moore [1990].
The contribution of this paper has been to systematically structure and re-
view the papers in this area and to have put them into the perspective of prop-
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erty right theory of the firm. It has been shown that the general thrust of theirs
can be interpreted as the first part of the solution to a the weak treatment of
unprotected information assets in classical the property right theory of the firm.
Finally, this paper has pointed out which directions for the literature can be
derived from this interpretation.
As a final word one may add that a further piece of potential extensions would
be to explicitly widen the scope from private organisations to organisations and
institutions in general. Other parts of organisational economics have successfully
been applied to organisations such as government agencies, see Garicano and
Posner [2005] as an example.
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Chapter 1: Derivation of Best Responses of i to j playing
O, F or W
Suppose j plays O
• state I, i plays S:
Agents will enter a cycle of alternating love such that total expected utility




αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 0 0 1 β + 1
t+1 1 0 1 0 2β + 1
t+2 0 1 0 1 β + 1
t+3 1 0 1 0 2β + 1
• state I, i plays O:
Agents jump to the full love equilibrium within one period and total ex-




αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 0 1 1 2β
t+1 1 1 1 1 4β
t+2 1 1 1 1 4β
• state I, i plays F :
This leads the agents to the full love steady state, but takes longer than
when i plays W . Total expected utility is Ui,t = (β + 1) + δ(2β + 1) +
δ22β + δ3 4β
1−δ .
.
αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 0 0 1 β + 1
t+1 1 0 1 0 2β + 1
t+2 0 1 1 1 2β
t+3 1 1 1 1 4β
• state I, i plays W :
This leads to the same situation as when i plays O.
89
• state III, i plays S:
The utility outcome is the same as in state I.
• state III, i plays O:
The outcome is the same as for strategy S.
• state III, i plays F :
The outcome is the same as for strategy W .
• state III, i plays W :
The utility outcome is the same as in state I.
We can now construct a strategy ranking. For state I we have:
S  F ⇔ (β + 1) + δ(2β + 1)
1− δ2
> (β + 1) + δ(2β + 1) + δ22β + δ3
4β
1− δ
⇔ δ < δ̂B1
(3.16)
F  {O,W} ⇔ (β + 1) + δ(2β + 1) + δ22β + δ3 4β
1− β
> 2β + δ
4β
1− δ











. For state III we have:





⇔ δ < δ̂B1.
(3.18)
Suppose j plays F
• state I, i plays S:
The outcome is the same as when j plays S and i plays S.
• state I, i plays O:
Here, within a couple of periods the agents reach the full love steady state,
total expected utility is Ui,t = β + δ(1 + δ) + δ




αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 0 1 0 β
t+1 0 1 0 1 β + 1
t+2 1 0 1 1 2β + 1
t+3 1 1 1 1 4β
• state I, i plays F :
The outcome is the same as when j plays S and i plays S.
• state I, i plays W :
The outcome is the same as when j plays S and i plays W .
• state III, i plays S:
Agents go to the full love equilibrium in two steps and total expected




αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 1 0 1 β + 1
t+1 1 0 1 1 2β + 1
t+2 1 1 1 1 4β
• state III, i plays O:
The outcome is the same as if i played S.
• state III, i plays F :
The outcome is the same as when j plays S and i plays F .
• state III, i plays W :
The outcome is the same as when j plays S and i plays W .
The strategy ranking for state I can be constructed in two steps:
{S, F}  O ⇔ 1
1− δ
> β + δ(1 + δ) + δ2(2β + 1) + δ3
4β
1− δ
⇔ δ < δ̂C1
(3.19)
O  W ⇔ β + δ(1 + δ) + δ2(2β + 1) + δ3 4β
1− δ
> β + δ2β + δ2
4β
1− δ





Where δ̂C1 cannot be determined analytically. It can be shown numerically,
however, that δ̂C1 > δ̂B1 for low levels of β and the other way around for high
levels and that δ̂C1 < δ̂A1 for all levels of β.
For state III, the strategy ranking is the following:





⇔ δ < δ̂C3 = δ̂C2.
(3.21)
Suppose j plays W
• state I, i plays S:
Agents go to the full love equilibrium within two periods and total expected




αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 0 0 1 β + 1
t+1 1 0 1 1 4β
t+2 1 1 1 1 4β
• state I, i plays O:
Agents jump to the full love equilibrium within one period and total ex-




αi,t αj,t wi,t wj,t ui,t
t 0 0 1 1 2β
t+1 1 1 1 1 4β
• state I, i plays F :
The outcome is the same as when i plays S.
• state I, i plays W :
The outcome is the same as when i plays O.
• state III:
For strategies S and W the outcomes are the same as in state I. Here
strategy O is equivalent to S and F is equivalent to W .
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It is immediate that β+1+δ 4β
1−δ ≷ 2β+δ
4β
1−δ can be reduced to 1 > β which
has been assumed.
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